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PREFACE 
This study is concerned with conditioning of three types of self-
disclosure, feedback, and two types of empathy statements in four 
member groups. The objective of the present study was to determine the 
effects of conditioning these affective verbalizations on group cohe-
siveness, empathy, tendency to self-disclose, and fourteen person per-
ception variables. 
The author wishes to thank Dr. Donald Fromme, Dr. Kenneth Sandvold, 
Dr. Larry Brown, and Dr. Edgar Webster for their help in completing 
this project. Special gratitude is also expressed to my wife, jane, 
for her understanding and encouragement. Finally, I wish to dedicate 
this paper to the memory of Donald V. Casey whose enthusiasm in living 
has greatly influenced me. 
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The most important question to be asked about group psychotherapy 
is "What elements in the process produce constructive personality 
change in clients?" It seems clear that a complete answer of this 
question must take into account the most obvious aspect of the group 
phenomenon, the verbal exchange among group participants. To date, at 
least three kinds of statements have been suggested to be of thera-
peutic importance in the psychological literature. These are self-
disclosure, interpersonal feedback, and empathic expression. 
Self-disclosure is a type of statement that seems to be of great 
therapeutic value in the group setting. When a person discloses him-
self to another group member it may have several significant effects. 
First, the person who disclosed has taken an important interpersonal 
risk. The individual has clearly indicated a willingness to take this 
risk in the context of the relationship with the other person. This, 
of course, is an indication of trust in the other person. It is im-
possible to communicate trust in another more clearly than to disclose 
significant affect laden information to the other. A second signifi-
cant effect of self-disclosure is that it may greatly aid a person's 
interpersonal relations since others can truly know him/her. It is 
impossible to relate effectively to another person if you know nothing 
1 
2 
of importance about him/her. The best source of important information 
about a person is that person. Thus, a prerequisite to an effective 
interpersonal relationship is self-disclosure among the parties of that 
relationship. A third effect of self-disclosure is that persons who 
disclose are likely to know themselves better. Persons may have vague 
feelings about their past actions, beliefs, or other aspects of self 
which come clearly into focus when they are expressed to another. This 
is the case since self-disclosure requires a successful effort at clear 
contact with the aspect of self to be verbalized. People can't ver-
bally communicate something about themselves to others if they don't 
have communion with that aspect of self. 
Interpersonal feedback, telling others how you see them, is also 
a type of statement that seems to have therapeutic value in the group 
setting. This type of statement appears to have at least two bene-
ficial effects. First, when group members give another member feed-
back, they are communicating to the other that they care enough about 
the relationship to discuss it. Even when the feedback given is a 
negative evaluation, it still communicates that the relationship is 
important and of at least enough value to merit feedback. Thus, inter-
personal feedback communicates a concern about an important interper-
sonal relationship. Secondly, interpersonal feedback helps to define a 
relationship as one in which important aspects are not hidden or over-
looked. Instead, feedback communicates an openness and a willingness 
to deal with the negative aspects of the relationship and also to dis-
cuss the positive aspects. Thus, feedback can be the basis of an open 
relationship. 
Empathic expression is the final type of therapeutic statement to 
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be discussed here. Empathic expression is a verbal attempt to under-
stand the feelings of another. In the group setting, this type of 
statement has essentially two beneficial effects. Empathic expression 
clearly and effectively demonstrates caring for and understanding of 
another. Perhaps the most important thing that people can give others 
is their empathic understanding. Empathic understanding requires a 
great deal of effort expended only for the purpose of knowing another. 
Thus, when a group member uses an empathic expression it creates a 
feeling of being cared for and of being understood in the target of the 
empathic statement. 
In self-disclosure, interpersonal feedback, and empathic expres-
sion we find three types of seemingly therapeutic statements each play-
ing a possible role in group psychotherapy. However, the relative 
efficacy of these statements in achieving therapeutic gains is not 
known. Understanding of the relative efficacy of these three important 
types of statements could greatly enhance the efficiency of group psy-
chotherapy. Such understanding would also, in part, answer the impor-
tant question delineated above. 
The present study is an attempt to determine the relative efficacy 
of three levels of self-disclosure, one type of interpersonal feedback, 
and one type of empathic expression in fostering group cohesiveness, 
group enjoyment, and group meaning by utilization of an operant group 
method to be discussed later in this chapter. In addition, the effect 
of these types of statements on person perception, tendency to self-
disclose, and empathy will also be examined. Research pertinent to the 
major factors used in the present study is found below, 
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Self-disclosure 
Perhaps the most notable of those who write about the importance 
of self-disclosure is Sidney Jourard. Jourard defines self-disclosure 
as "talking about oneself to another person" (Jourard, 1964, p. 19) or 
as the process of making the self known to other persons (Jourard and 
Lasakow, 1958). Self-disclosure is the most important mode of inter-
personal interaction, according to Jourard. Self-disclosure is not 
only a therapeutic factor in the treatment of psychopathology, but lack 
of disclosure is the prime etiological mechanism. All psychopathology 
is due to a lack of self-disclosure since a person who fails to dis-
close to some optimal degree fails to truly know him/herself (Jourard, 
1964). Jourard (1958) also indicated that self-disclosure is also a 
symptom of mental health. 
Despite the importance of self-disclosure, disclosing behavior is 
very rare in mo~t relationships. Jourard (1964) indicated that people 
play social roles in so many of their transactions that there are 
almost no real person to person transactions. The reason that there 
are so few self-disclosures according to Jourard is that non-disclosure 
is a rule broken only "when we experience it is safe to be known and 
when we believe that vital values will be gained if we are known in our 
authentic being or lost if we are not" (Jourard, 1967, p. 28). 
Other writers agree that disclosure is a rarity. Laing (1967) in-
dicated that people present an edited version of the self in most 
transactions. Similarly, Pearce and Sharp (1973) indicated that very 
little disclosure occurs in most communication. Thus, it seems that in 
self-disclosure we have a very important but very rare phenomenon. 
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Before I discuss some of the important research findings concern-
ing self-disclosure I will consider some of the many ways in which the 
concept of self-disclosure has been analyzed into smaller components 
for the purpose of more rigorous study. The most used analysis of 
self-disclosure has been based on the intimacy of the material dis-
closed (Edelman and Snead, 1972; Charkin and Derlega, 1974; Taylor, 
1968; Ellison and Firestone, 1974; Jourard and Resnick, 1970; Vondracek 
and Marshall, 1971; Fitzgerald, 1963; Ribner, 1974). Perhaps the 
second most utilized scheme for analyzing self-disclosure is one using 
different categories of content (Chittick and Himelstein, 1967; Himel-
stein and Kimbrough, 1963; Pederson and Breglio, 1968; Jourard and 
Lasakow, 1958). Another way in which self-disclosure has been analyzed 
was developed by Lazarus (1969). This author used the conceptual 
scheme of five concentric circles where the innermost circle repre-
sented the aspects of self that were disclosed to no one; the next 
larger circle represented the aspects of self that were disclosed only 
to very intimate friends; the third largest circle represented aspects 
of self that were disclosed to several good friends; the fourth largest 
circle represented aspects of self that were disclosed to acquaintances; 
and the largest circle represented a person's superficial contact with 
the world at large. This scheme i~ closely related to the intimacy 
dimension mentioned above. 
The analytic scheme to be used in the present study is closely re-
lated to all three analytic schemes mentioned above. On the face of it, 
a content analytic scheme is used. Three categories of content, non-
affective or demographic disclosure, externally referred affective dis-
closure, and self-referred affective disclosure, are used. These cate-
gories of content appear to be strongly related to the intimacy 
dimension. It would seem that nonaffective or demographic disclosure 
is least intimate while self-referred affective disclosure is the most 
intimate. 
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It is well now to consider some of the important research findings 
concerning disclosure. Adesso, et al. (1974) studied disclosure in 
growth groups and discussion groups composed of college students. Re-
sults showed that after five two hour sessions, positive affective 
self-disclosure was greater in the growth groups than in the discus-
sion groups. No significant difference in negative affective self-
disclosure was apparent between the two types of groups after the five 
sessions. This study shows that growth groups cause an increase in 
positive self-disclosure but don't significantly affect negative dis-
closure. This result is meaningful since it indicates that growth 
groups indeed affect self-disclosing behavior. This may be a key in 
looking for the effective aspects of this particular type of group. 
In another study (Cravens, 1975) college females were divided into 
those with a high need for social approval and those with a low need 
for social approval. The disclosure of these subjects was observed in 
interviews with the experimenter in two types of situations. In one 
situation, the subject was told that the interview data would be used 
in a textbook. This situation was devised to make the subjects believe 
their statements were open to the public. In a second situation, sub-
jects were told their statements were private and that there would be 
complete confidentiality. Results showed that low social approval sub-
jects exhibited more instances of self-disclosing in the private con-
dition than in the public conditi9n. Just the opposite was found for 
the high social approval subjects. These results indicate that social 
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approval and level of confidentiality are important factors in deter-
mining self-disclosing behavior. It is especially pertinent to psycho-
therapy groups which usually adhere to the rule of strict confidential-
ity. If self-disclosure is truly therapeutic, low social approval 
clients will be helped by the confidentiality rule. High social 
approval clients may not be too greatly hindered in self-disclosure by 
the confidentiality rule due to the social context provided by the 
group. 
Several studies have found sex differences in disclosing behavior. 
Jourard and Lasakow (1958) found that female undergraduates were con-
sistently higher self-disclosers than were males. Jourard (1971) also 
found his female subjects consistently more self-disclosing than men. 
A recent study (Kraft and Vraa, 1975) found that high school females 
disclosed more than high school males. These findings are attributed 
by Jourard (1964) to the lethal aspects of the male role that are ex-
tremely repressive and restrictive of the male self and thus cause a 
marked lack of self-disclosing behavior. 
Chelune (1975) also studied sex differences in self-disclosing 
behavior. This investigator looked at disclosure in repressors and 
sensitizers of both sexes. No significant difference was found between 
the sexes in the repressor group. However, male sensitizers proved to 
be lower disclosers than female sensitizers. Chelune explained his re-
sults as being due to differences between the sex roles. Females learn 
to gain control over noxious stimulation or threat of it by disclosing 
fully to elicit help from others. Males, of course, are unable to take 
this approach since the male role has no room for this type of extreme 
dependency. Males, then, must protect themselves from noxious 
stimulation or interpersonal threat by controlling disclosure to main-
tain a safe interpersonal distance. 
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Although sex differences have been found by some investigators, 
others have failed to find them. For example, Zief (1962) and Rickers-
Ovsiankina and Kusmin (1958) both failed to find any significant dif-
ference between males and females in amount of self-disclosing behavior. 
These findings raise questions about the validity of Jourard's (1964) 
analysis of the differences between the male and the female roles. 
Perhaps the best documented finding concerning self-disclosure is 
its property of reciprocity. Self-disclosure by an individual to a 
second party is usually accompanied by a reciprocal disclosure from the 
second party to the first (Jourard and Landsman, 1960; Jourard and Res-
nick, 1970; Jourard and Jaffee, 1970; Ehrlich and Graeven, 1971; 
Levinger and Senn, 1967; Cozby, 1972; Derlega, Walmer, and Furman, 
1973). This property of reciprocity suggests that self-disclosure, 
once started, may have a "snow-balling" effect such that its frequency 
increases rapidly after the first disclosure. In an attempt to explain 
the snow-balling effect seen with self-disclosing behavior, Higbee 
(1973) applied the well documented risky shift concept to self-disclo-
sure. In the risky shift, people are seen as valuing risk. When a 
person is informed that others are as risky or more so than he/she is, 
he/she tends to adopt a greater level of this valued attribute. Thus, 
groups adopt riskier solutions to problems than the average individual 
in that group would have if he/she were left alone. It would seem then 
that this phenomenon might generalize to self-disclosure which might be 
thought of as interpersonal risk. Higbee found evidence that self-
disclosure was indeed a valued thing. His subjects, on the average, 
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rated themselves as more disclosing than their peers. Higbee also 
found that his subjects increased their willingness to disclose when 
they received information that others were of equal or greater willing-
ness to disclose. Thus, it is possible that the reciprocity effects 
seen in self-disclosure may be due to the fact that the first instance 
of disclosure to others shows others that the discloser is high on this 
valued trait. If the other's want to be seen as high on this trait 
they must disclose themselves. In this way the snowballing effect is 
started and perpetuated. 
Although the literature supports the concept of reciprocity in 
general, not all disclosures are equally effective in producing the 
effect. Three recent studies have dealt with this problem. Simonson 
(1976) used a psychotherapy analogue with female college students to 
study the effect of therapist disclosure on subsequent client disclo-
sure. Three levels of therapist disclosure were explored. In one con-
dition, the therapist disclosed demographic information. In another, 
the therapist disclosed personal information. In the third condition, 
there was no therapist disclosure. Results indicated that demographic 
disclosure was superior in producing subsequent subject disclosure when 
compared with the other two conditions. It is true that some disclosure 
is necessary for the reciprocity effect to occur. This accounts for the 
superiority of demographic disclosure over no disclosure. Perhaps the 
most important finding, however, is that demographic disclosure produced 
greater reciprocity than personal disclosure. This may be due to sub-
jects perceiving personal disclosure as being inappropriately intimate. 
Two other studies are related to this finding. Banikiotes and Daher 
(1974) and Daher and Banikiotes (1974) concluded that the amount of 
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interpersonal attraction to another was positively related to the level 
of self-disclosure to that other. A second major finding of these 
studies was that individuals are more attracted to persons who are sim-
ilar to them in both the content and the level of self-disclosure than 
those who are dissimilar. The direct implication of these findings is 
that disclosures must be of appropriate content and frequency for any 
snow-balling effect to occur. This is consistent with the interpreta-
tion of demographic disclosure producing more reciprocity than personal 
disclosure used above. Disclosures that are too personal, not personal 
enough, irrelevant to others, too frequent, or not frequent enough will 
limit any reciprocity tendency. In light of these findings it is like-
ly that in the Simonson study, the personal disclosure was not similar 
enough to the subject's intended disclosure while demographic disclosure 
was. Thus, reciprocity was hindered in the personal condition but en-
hanced in the demographic condition. In the no disclosure condition, 
no reciprocity effects were possible. 
Besides findings concerning sex differences and reciprocity, other 
generalities concerning self-disclosure may be found in the literature. 
For example, Pearce and Sharp (1973) list four such generalities that 
may be justified on the basis of their extensive literature review. 
These generalitie~ are as follows: self-disclosure occurs incrementally 
as a relationship stabilizes; self-disclosure occurs in the context of 
positive social relationships; self-disclosure in a dyad is usually 
symmetrical; and few communications involve self-disclosure. 
Interpersonal Feedback 
The second of the important therapeutic statements, interpersonal 
feedback, has been defined by Ruesch and Kees (1959). These authors 
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assert that feedback refers to the process of correction through incor-
poration of information concerning effects. When a person perceives 
the results produced by his own actions, the information so derived in-
fluences subsequent action. Thus, feedback information is a steering 
device upon which learning and the correction of misunderstandings are 
based. The importance of interpersonal feedback in group settings has 
been affirmed by Cambell and Dunnette (1968). These investigators 
stated that feedback was perhaps the most important aspect of the 
T-group technology. Psychologists studying groups are not the only 
people that assert that interpersonal feedback is important. Group 
members also acknowledge the significance of feedback. This finding 
was reported by Lieberman, Yalom, and Miles (1973) in an extensive study 
of encounter groups. Subjects in this study ranked feedback, the 
process of receiving information about oneself from others, as the most 
important factor promoting change in their group. The authors analyzed 
this result more closely by looking at the outcome variable. They sep-
arated the group participants in their study into three outcome cate-
gories (negative outcome, unchanged, and positive outcome). The result 
of this categori.zation was the finding that significantly more uncha.nged 
and negative outcome subjects indicated that feedback producing a cog-
nitive change was important for them than did the group that improved. 
Also, more negative outcome subjects indicated that feedback ir..volving 
a. negative feeling response was important to them than did either of the 
other categories. When these results are taken together :i.t seerr1s highly 
plausible that negative affective feedback may produce negative outcomes. 
It is interesting to note that positive feeling responses were not in-
dicated to be of importance more frequently in the positive outcome 
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category. Thus, it is cle.ar that although feedback is an important in-
terpersona.l process it can ha.ve negative effects and that these negative 
effects are esped.ally likely when feedback involves a negative feeH.ng 
response. 
Yalom (1970) also discussed the possible effects of feedback in 
group psychotherapy. This author, however, dealt mainly with positive 
or growth effects that might be related to feedback. For example, 
Yalom :f.ndic.ated that feedback facilitates interpersonal learning and 
therapeutic change. It also enable.s people to restructure the:i.r self-
image and helps them to see. the universality of their problems. Feed-
back helps people challenge previously cherished beliefs about them-
selves and to experiment with new modes of behavior. Positive feedback 
especially encourages group members to take risks and change. Yalom 
also reported that feedback occurring in the context of ongoing here 
and now interactions is the most effective and important type of feed-
back. 
Watson (1969) also found many positive results of feedback beha-
vior. On the basis of his extensive review of the literature, this 
author listed seven positive effects that may result from the use of 
feedback; first, feedback is related to increased awareness of self in 
interaction with others; secondly, feedback increases the accuracy of 
perception of the feelings and overt behavior of others; thirdly, feed-
back increases openness in interpersonal relations; fourth, feedback 
increases acceptance of differences in others; fifth, feedback decreases 
extreme interpersonal need in the areas of control, inclusion, and 
affection; sixth, feedback increases understanding of group behavior; 
and lastly, feedback increases self-confidence in interpersonal inter-
action. 
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Another author who has taken an extensive look at interpersonal 
feedback is Dyer (1972). Dyer defined interpersonal feedback as a 
process of information sharing in which a person receives information 
from others about his/her behavioral performance. This information 
sharing process can be divided into two components. The first component 
that is present in most instances of feedback is a description of what 
behavior a person sees in another. This is strictly an informational 
component. The second component of feedback, which may or may not be 
present, is the communication of how a person feels about the behavior 
he sees in another. In his analysis of the feedback concept, Dyer de-
lineates eight specific types. First is objective-descriptive feedback 
which consists entirely of a description of the behavior of another 
with no feeling component. This type of feedback simply gives the re-
ceiver a mirror image of himself. A second type of feedback is 
assumed or guessed impact. Here, person A tells person B what impact 
he thinks B's behavior has had on person C. This is related to a third 
type of feedback called second party report of impact. In this type, 
person A tells person B that person C told A what impact B's behavior 
had on C. A fourth type of feedback, direct descriptive impact, con-
sists of person A telling person B what B's behavior is like and what 
feelings A has about it. Dyer indicated that direct descriptive impact 
was the most important and most effective form of feedback. Direct 
evaluation is a fifth feedback type that occurs when person B's behavior 
has an impact on person A and A tells B only what his/her feelings are 
but not which of B's behaviors he/she is reacting to. Dyer's sixth 
type of feedback is called direct expressive and like direct evaluative, 
is composed entirely of the feeling component. Here person A expresses 
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a feeling he/she has toward person B but he/she does not react to a 
particular behavior in B but rather to B's total being. The seventh 
type of feedback is called interpretation where person A tells person B 
what his/her actions mean. The last type discussed by Dyer is nonverbal 
feedback where person B receives information about his behavior by 
watching person A's nonverbal reactions to his/her behavior. Dyer in-
dicated that these forms of feedback can be used by people to make ap-
propriate behavioral and perceptual changes and to improve relation-
ships. Dyer also indicated that feedback can be used to hurt or punish 
people. Thus, it is probable that the results of feedback are not 
always positive. 
Thibault and Coules (1952) report a study that definitely indica-
ted that not all feedback produces positive results. These investiga-
tors paid a stooge to communicate hostile feedback to their subjects. 
The stooge called the subject a liar, deceitful, and egotistical. 
Finally, the stooge stated that the subject wasn't the kind of person 
that the stooge would care to associate with. It must be mentioned here 
that the use of the term feedback in this study is questionable since 
feedback is usually reserved for instances where the "feedback" state-
ment is dependent on actions. Half of the subjects in this experiment 
were allowed to respond to this instigation and half were not. Those 
that were not showed heightened hostility toward the stooge when com-
pared with those that were allowed to respond. Thus, hostile negative 
instigation can produce hositility and if the person receiving the 
hostile instigation is able to give his own feedback the hostility is 
not as strong. This suggests that hostile feedback may create hostility 
and that feedback may not always have positive results. 
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Jacobs, Jacobs, Gatz, and Schiable (1973) examined the credibility 
of positive and negative feedback. This study resulted in what the 
authors termed the credibility gap. This term refers to the fact that 
the subjects in this experiment rated positive feedback as being much 
more credible than negative feedback. Jacobs, Jacobs, Feldman, and 
Caviar (1973) studied the credibility gap in groups. Three types of 
feedback were delineated. These three were closely related to the com-
ponents of feedback discussed by Dyer (1972). The first type of feed-
back was termed behavioral. This type dealt entirely with a descrip-
tion of overt behavior. A second type of feedback was termed emotional 
and dealt entirely with a description of the emotions a person's be-
havior creates in one. The third type of feedback was a mixture of the 
first two. By using this categorization the study attempted to further 
analyze the credibility gap. Results indicated that positive feedback 
was not only more credible but also more desirable and more meaningful 
in terms of impact than negative feedback. In addition, negative feed-
back that is behavioral is more credible than negative emotional feed-
back. Group cohesion was also related to these feedback types. Nega-
tive feedback resulted in less cohesion than positive feedback. Also, 
behavioral/emotional feedback created less cohesion than did behavioral 
or emotional feedback. Lastly, this study found that behavioral feed-
back was most effective for promoting change. 
Several studies have looked specifically at the effectiveness of 
feedback for promoting change. The results of Stoller (1968) indicated 
that behavioral feedback that is discrepant from one's self-image is 
effective in promoting change. A study by Bach (1969) resulted in the 
finding that feedback is of highest effectiveness when it is maximally 
16 
informative and minimally evaluative. Thus, these two studies and 
Jacobs, Jacobs, Feldman, and Cavior (1973) each conclude that behavioral 
rather than emotional feedback is most effective. 
Empathic Expression 
The third type of therapeutic statement to be dealt with in this 
paper is empathic expression. A definition of empathy is offered by 
Truax and Carkhuff (1967). These authors indicated that empathy in-
volves the sensitivity to current feelings of others and the verbal 
facility to communicate this sensitivity. This definition is illustra-
tive of the way in which most psychologists think about the concept. 
Empathy, then, is an understanding of the feelings of another. A defi-
nitional study was done by Greif and Hogan (1973). These authors used 
the factor analytic method to derive three definitional components of 
empathy; tolerance or even-temperedness, sociable interpersonal style, 
and humanistic sociopolitical attitudes. 
Several articles have asserted the importance of empathy for every-
day living (Greif and Hogan, 1973; Aspy, 1970; Goodman and Ofshe, 1968). 
In fact, one study (Barke, 1971) indicated that empathy is an important 
interpersonal developmental task that is accomplished by children as 
young as three years old. Thus, our empathic ability importantly influ-
ences our interpersonal functioning throughout most of our life. 
Many studies have dealt with the attributes of high empathic versus 
low empathic subjects. For example, Mehrabian.and Epstein (1972) found 
that high empathy subjects were less likely to engage in aggressive be-
havior than were low empathy subjects. Higp empathy subjects in this 
study were also more likely to engage in helping behavior than their 
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less empathic counterparts. Pierce and Zark (1972) indicated that high 
empathy subjects had significantly better interpersonal effectiveness 
than did subjects with low empathic ability. Also, the high empathy 
subjects in this study attended to the feelings of others much more 
than low empathy subjects. Schoen (1970) also looked at differences 
between high empathy and low empathy subjects and found that high em-
pathy subjects are much better in predicting the behavior of others. 
Thus, the results of Mehrabian and Epstein (1972), Pierce and Zark 
(1972) and Schoen (1970) clearly assert that empathy is related to a 
constellation of adaptive interpersonal skills. In a study of inter-
personal attraction, Phares and Wilson (1971) indicated that high 
empathy subjects were attracted to other high empathy subjects while 
low empathy subjects were attracted to other low empathy subjects. This 
may be due to subjects feeling more comfortable with people of compara-
ble interpersonal skills. A study by Vespiani (1969) concerning empathy 
and the depression and psychasthenia scales of the M.M.P.I. resulted in 
the finding that high empathy subjects were likely to have lower scores 
on each of these scales when compared to low empathy subjects. Thus, 
low empathy has been shown to be related to two measures of psychopath-
ology while high empathy is related to a relative absence of these 
traits. 
Empathy has long been considered to have great importance in psy-
chotherapy. This idea was most strongly promoted by Carl Rogers (1957) 
who indicated that empathy was a necessary condition for therapeutic 
improvement. Rogers also affirmed that when empathy was coupled with 
what he called warmth and genuineness in therapy, sufficient conditions 
for therapeutic change were present. Thus, all that is needed to insure 
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therapeutic change is empathy, warmth, and genuineness. Several studies 
related to this idea that empathy is related to positive therapeutic 
outcome have been done. Truax, Wittner, and Wargo (1971), Truax (1970), 
Mullen and Abeles (1971), and Shapiro (1969) all agree that their data 
are indicative of the relationship between high empathy and positive 
therapeutic outcome. Mullen and Abeles (1971) also found that more ex-
perienced therapists were more empathic than were less experienced 
therapists. 
The relationship between empathy and therapeutic outcome is not 
entirely clear, however. Some investi~ators have failed to find the 
relationship reported above. For example, Garfield and Bergin (1971) 
found no relation between outcome a,nd empathy. 
Finally, in my consideration of empathy it is well to include the 
work of Smith (1973) since his work is divergent from the mainstream. 
As was indicated above, most of those who study empathy think of the 
concept as the ability to understand the feelings of another. Smith, 
however, rejects this definition. He defines empathy as the degree of 
similarity that persons assume exists between themselves and another 
person. To achieve empathic accuracy persons must learn the ways in 
which they are unlike another. To do this they must receive feedback 
concerning the accuracy of their assumptions of similarity. Empathy, 
assumed similarity, is the basis of understanding another but it is also 
the basis of misunderstanding. In sensitivity training, Smith does not 
want to establish more empathy, assumed similarity, but rather wants to 
improve the trainee's ability to predict the feelings, thoughts, and 
behavior of other people. In order to do this trainees must be 
sensitive to differences between individuals and themselves. This 
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precludes the automatic assumption of similarity since the trainee must 
consider the important ways in which each of us differ to be truly sen-
sitive. 
Smith has indicated that h~ghly empathic persons see themselves as 
conservative, conforming, religious, emotional but inhibited, gregarious 
but quiet and acquiescent, and practical. They empathize because they 
want to see similarities between themselves and others in order to feel 
close to others. Smith indicated that empathy creates goodness. The 
more similarities we see between others and ourselves, the better we 
tend to perceive them to be. Not only does empathy cause the perception 
of goodness in others, it also causes us to look at and listen to 
others. When someone is seen as like us we attend to them. If someone 
is perceived as unlike us, we fail to give them attention. 
Person Perception 
The next major area of literature to be reviewed concerns the per-
ceptual process related to interpersonal functioning, The concept of 
person perception concerns the way in which we "read" each other in our 
interpersonal interactions. It would seem possible that one way in 
which group therapy has effectiveness in changing clients' personalities 
is in changing their person perceptual processes. This is precisely 
what Smith (1973) attempts to do in sensitivity training. 
The concept of person perception may be split into six basic types. 
The first type of person perception and perhaps the most basic is the 
perception of self. The second type of person perception is the per-
ception of another. The third type of person perception is the percep-
tion of a third party. Each of these types of person perceptions are 
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truly perceptions in the sense that they have a referent in the percep-
tual field. The last three types of person perception might better be 
called metaperceptions since they are really perceptions of the first 
three types of person perceptions. Specifically, the fourth type of 
person perception is one's perception of how other persons see one. 
The fifth type of person perception to be considered is one's perception 
of how other persons see themselves. The final type of person percep-
tion is perception of how other's see third parties. To further clarify 
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The first area of literature to be reviewed here concerns the first 
type of person perception, how a person see~ himse~f. Several deter-
minants of self-perception have been delineated in the literature. One 
of the most studied determinants of a person's self-concept is others' 
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perceptions of him/her. Backman, Secord, and Peirce (1963) studied the 
resistance to change of aspects of a person's self-concept as a function 
of the consensus among significant others concerning those aspects of 
self. Subjects in this study were required to choose an aspect of them-
selves that they believed their significant others generally attributed 
to them. They were also required to choose an aspect of themselves 
that they believed significant others did not generally attribute to 
them. After these aspects were chosen, the investigators presented the 
subjects with a false personality assessment that denied the subject's 
possession of both of the traits the subjects had chosen. In this way, 
strong pressure was exerted on the subjects to change their self-con-
ception. Results showed that subjects changed their conception of self 
in regard to the low consensus trait significantly more than in regard 
to the high consensus trait. Thus it is much more difficult to change 
aspects of one's self that one believes to be generally evident to 
others than it is to change what one believes are less evident traits. 
This clearly shows that a type of metaperception, one's perception of 
how others see one, is influential in determining perception of self. 
Another study relevant to the effect of other's perception of a 
person on that person's self-perception was done by Janis (1955). This 
author, similar to Backman, Secord, and Peirce, found that one's self-
perceptions were markedly influenced by others' perceptions. However, 
Janis found that self-perceptions did not influence others' perceptions 
of one. These results indicate the tendency to alter one's self-per-
ception to be congruent with other's perception of one's self. However, 
people do not show the tendency to make the perception of others con-
gruent to the other's self-perceptions. 
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Hass and Maehr (1965) studied the effects of another's perception 
of one and one's self-perception. These investigators concluded that 
not only were other's reactions of extreme importance to their subjects' 
self-conceptions, but the consistency of these reactions was important 
also. Experimentally induced changes in self-ratings were found to be 
long lived on a six week follow up after only one exposure to another's 
discrepant reaction. The authors found even stronger and longer lived 
effects when their subjects were exposed to another's reaction two 
times. Thus, it is clear that consistent reactions by others have a 
large effect on one's self-perception. 
The studies done by Backman, Secord, and Peirce (1963), Janis 
(1965), and Hass and Maehr (1965) all clearly indicate that the percep-
tion of one's self is greatly influenced by what one perceives others 
to see in one. One's self-image surely has the tendency to be largely 
congruent with others' perceptions of one's self. 
Another study that bears on the effect others can have on one's 
self-perception was completed by Gergen and Wishov (1965). This inves-
tigation does not deal specifically with the effect of another's percep-
tion of a person but rather with the characteristics of the other. 
Subjects in this study were told they would interact with either a self-
enhancing person, a self-derogative person, or a person of average self-
evaluation. Subjects then completed a self-rating. Results showed that 
subject self-perceptions emphasized positive aspects of self if they 
were going to interact with a self-enhancing person. Negative aspects 
of self were e~phasized when the subject thought he/she would interact 
with either a self-derogating person or a person of average self-
evaluation. This result is indicative of the effect of others' self-
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evaluations on one's own self-evaluation. 
Another much studied determinant of self-perception is a person's 
family, especially his/her parents. One study (Gecas, Calonico, and 
Thomas; 1974) explored the mirror theory and the modeling theory of the 
development of the self-concept in children. Mirror theory states that 
a child's perception of self is most strongly influenced by his/her 
parents' perception of him/her while the modeling theory states that a 
child's self-perception is most strongly influenced by his/her parents' 
self-perceptions. In general, this study supported mirror theory. 
Another finding was that mirroring tended to be stronger in cross-sex 
parent-child relationships than in same-sex relationships. Also, both 
boys and girls tended to model their father more than their mother. 
Munns (1972) also studied self-perceptions of college males and how 
they are affected by parental and peer values. The results of this 
study indicate that males perceive themselves to be somewhat like their 
fathers in theoretical, social, political, and religious values. The 
major result of this study, however, was that the subjects perceived 
themselves as much closer to their peer group on all values studied 
than to either of their parents. Thus, in perception of one's values, 
peers have the strongest influence although the father also has some 
influence. Cava and Raush (1952) also studied self-perception. These 
investigators looked at the variables of personality conflict and their 
subjects' perceptions of their fathers' interests. Results of this 
study showed that boys with little personality conflict tended to see 
their own interests as similar to their father's interests. Boys with 
a high degree of personality conflict, on the other hand, tended to 
perceive their interests as disimilar to their father's. Thus, not 
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only does it appear that fathers have an effect on a boy's self-percep-
tions, it also appears that this effect is related to personality con-
flict and the lack of it. Another study of familial effect on self-
perceptions was done by Helper (1955). The focus of this investigation 
was to apply learning theory to the self-concept of boys and girls. 
For boys, it was found that self-perceptions tended to be similar to 
the perception of father when there was a high degree of parental 
reward given to the child for modeling behavior. With less reward there 
was less similarity between father and the boy's perception of himself. 
It was also found with boys that a high degree of modeling was related 
to a high degree of status among peers. None of these relationships 
were found for girls. It was found, however, that girls who received 
a high degree of parental reward for modeling mother had a low amount 
of status among peers. Thus, there is evidence of important sex differ-
ences in the effect of modeling the same-sexed parent on self-perception. 
A final study related to familial effects on self-perception has been 
done by Luckey (1961). This study focused on marriage as it affected 
perception of self. The marriages in this study were divided into two 
groups, satisfied and less satisfied. Satisfied males' self-perceptions 
were significantly closer to their wives' perceptions of them than were 
less satisfied males' self-perceptions. Also, satisfied males tended 
to see themselves as more like their ideal selves than did less satis-
fied males. Satisfied males saw themselves as very similar to their 
fathers while less satisfied males saw themselves as different from 
their fathers. Similar differences were not found between satisfied and 
less satisfied females. 
Another determinant of self-perceptions that has been investigated 
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is the concept of social anxiety (Clark and Arkowitz, 1975). High and 
low socially anxious men participated in two brief conversations with a 
female confederate. Each subject rated himself on social skills and 
anxiety. A rating of the female confederate was also obtained. Results 
indicated that high anxious males rated themselves as more anxious and 
more deficient in social skills than low anxious subjects. No differ-
ence was found in the subjects' ratings of the female confederate. 
Trained judges also made ratings of the subjects. These judges rated 
the high anxious subjects higher in social skills and lower in anxiety 
than the high anxious subjects rated themselves. Judges rated low 
anxious subjects lower in social skills than they rated themselves. 
Thus, a high level of anxiety appears to affect the perception of one's 
social skills and interpersonal anxiety adversely while low levels of 
anxiety appears to enhance the perception of interpersonal anxiety but 
not the perception of social skills. High anxiety causes lower self-
perceptions of interpersonal skills and higher perceptions of social 
anxiety than others perceive. Low anxiety causes an inflated perception 
of social skills when compared to others' evaluations. 
Social comparison and competition also has been studied as affect-
ing self-perceptions (Morse and Gergen, 1970). This study presented 
job applicants with stimulus persons whose characteristics were either 
socially desirable or undesirable. Half of the subjects in this study 
were told that the stimulus person was competing with them for the same 
position and the others were not told this. It was found that subjects 
presented with a desirable stimulus person decreased their self-esteem 
while those presented with an undesirable stimulus person increased 
their self-esteem. This was in evidence regardless of competition. 
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Thus, the effect of social comparison was clearly supported but no com-
petition effect was found. 
Another determinant of self-perception that has been investigated 
is failure. Mischel and Ebbesen (1973) assigned their subjects to 
success, failure, or control groups. These groups of subjects were in-
formed that they would perform a task measuring their intellectual 
ability. Half of the subjects in each group were told to expect fur-
ther testing while the other half were not. After completion of the 
task and feedback from the experimenters, subjects were allowed to look 
at positive and negative personality information concerning themselves. 
Subjects who got success feedback concerning the intellectual task 
attended more to their personality assets and less to their liabilities 
than did subjects who failed or the controls. Subjects who failed di.d 
not differ significantly from the c.ontrols. Although these effects 
were found for the group of subjects who beli.eved no further testing 
would be done, they were even stronger for those who believed further 
testing would be done. It was also found that sensi.tizers were more 
likely to attend to their liabilities while repressors were more likely 
to attend to their assets. These results are indicative of a tendency 
to pe.rceive one's self in less favorable light after a. failure experi-
ence than after a success experience. Another study (Collison, 1974.) 
also corroborates this idea. Third grade subjects w·hc "rere failed on 
a math test had a. significantly lower self-conc.ept than did those who 
suc.ceeded on the test. 
A final determinant of self-percepHons that has been investigated 
is race. Clark ar..d Clark (1939) found that when three year old black 
boys were asked to identify themselves by choosi.ng a line drawing of a 
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white boy, a black boy, a lion, a dog, a clowL"., and a hen the children 
chose either the w·hi.te boy or the black boy predominantly. The ratio of 
choices of the black boy to choices of the white boy increased as a 
func.tion of age unt.:f.l about a.ge five. Thus, in black children, race 
conc:f.ousn.ess :f.s ac.hieve.d by age f:f.ve. Another investigation of race 
effects on self-perception was done by Krate, Leventhal, and Si.lverste.in 
(1.974). TheEe authors measured the self-percepts of black college stu-
dents B.s recalled for two years before the study, four years before the 
study, now, and the future, Results led the authors to conclude that 
there is a d:fsta.ncing away from the "Negro" identity and a converging 
toward the more contemporary "Black" identity. McDonald and Gunther 
(1965) studied the differences between black and white adolescents' 
self-perceptions. This investigation showed black adolescents to have 
higher perceived dominance and love scores than white adolescents. The 
three studies reported above clearly indicate that race is a factor in 
the perception of self. 
At this point it is important to note the relationship between 
self-disclosing verbiage and perception of self. Self-disclosure is 
nothing more than verbalizing information concerning one's self-percep-
tion. It might be thought of as direct perception of the first person 
as is seen in Table I. Because these two concepts are so closely 
united, it is not unjustified to expect to find self-perceptual effects 
in therapy groups in which self-disclosure is used frequently. 
Another type of person perception is the perception of others. 
One way to look at variables affecting perception of others is to cate-
gorize these variables on the basis of locus. For example, variables 
that affect perception of others are found within the perceiver while 
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others are found in the person being perceived. Still other pertinent 
variables may be found in the relationship between the perceiver and 
the perceived. A final locus for variables affecting perception of 
others is external to the perceiver, the perceived, and their rela~ 
tionship. 
One variable within the perceiver that has been studied in rela-
tion to perception of others is authoritarianism. Crockett and Mer-
clinger (1956) studied the relationship between authoritarianism and the 
accuracy of perception of others. Results from this study indicated 
that high authoritarian individuals tend to perceive their peers as 
having high authoritarianism regardless of their peer's actual author-
itarianism. Low authoritarian subjects, on the other hand, were quite 
variable in their estimation of their peer's authoritarianism. In 
general, however, low authoritarianism subjects estimated their peers 
to be either moderate or high in authoritarianism. The results con-
cerning the accuracy of the perception of others by low and high 
authoritarian subjects did not show a significant difference. Thus, 
high authoritarian subjects tend to perceive others as high authori-
tarian and low authoritarian subjects are variable in their perception 
of other's authoritarianism. Neither group of subjects appears to be 
more accurate than the other, however. Jones (1955) also studied 
authoritarianism and initial perceptions of others. The results of 
this investigation suggest that in the perception of others, authori-
tarian subjects are more insensitive to psychological or personality 
characteristics since they were less able to accurately perceive these 
characteristics than were nonauthoritarian subjects. This study found 
this type of insensitivity even in regard to the attribute of personal 
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power or forcefulness. Also, authoritarians show a greater tendency 
than nonauthoritarians to differentiate the social environment in terms 
of power related concepts in spite of their reduced sensitivity to 
variations among people in personal power. In this study authoritar-
ians showed the tendency to be more positively evaluative of leaders 
than nonauthoritarians regardless of the leader's specific character-
istics. 
Other perceiver variables that have been investigated in relation 
to their effects on perception of others are self-esteem and the feeling 
of acceptance. Dittes (1959) separated his subjects into two conditions. 
In one condition, subjects were warmly accepted by a group. In the 
other condition, subjects were poorly accepted. Subjects in the warm 
acceptance condition perceived the group to be more attractive than 
poorly accepted subjects. When the concept of self-esteem was examined 
it was evident that this effect was much stronger in persons with low 
self-esteem than in persons with high self-esteem. Thus, it seems that 
there is an interaction effect between self-esteem and acceptance by 
others on perception of others. This may be the case since the degree 
of lack of self-esteem may be precisely the degree of need for accept-
ance by others. When a person lacks self-esteem, he/she especially 
needs acceptance from others. When he/she receives this acceptance, 
those who offer the needed acceptance are perceived as attractive. The 
opposite is true for those who do not offer acceptance. 
A final perceiver variable to be discussed here is use of expres-
sive cues offered by the behavior of the perceived person. Gage (1952), 
in part, studied the effect of the use of expressive cues versus the 
perceiver's knowledge of the subculture of the perceived person in their 
effects on the accuracy of other perception. Results indicated that 
accuracy of other perception is affected to a slight extent by the use 
of cues derived from another's expressive behavior. However, accuracy 
of other perception can result from accuracy of perception of individ-
uals, from an accurate stereotype, or from a combination of both fac-
tors. Cronbach (1955) has also made this observation. 
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The first variable concerning the perceived person to be consid-
ered in its effect on the perception of others is conformity versus 
deviance. This variable was investigated by Streufert (1965) in its 
relationship to interpersonal distance. Interpersonal distance is a 
concept which combines spatial closeness and temporal lengths of inter-
action in groups. Results of this study indicate that the attitude 
toward conforming group members became more favorable as interpersonal 
distance decreased. In addition, it was found that attitudes toward a 
deviant group member became more unfavorable as interpersonal distance 
decreased. As people become closer to deviants they perceive them more 
negatively and as people become closer to conforming members, they per-
ceive them more positively. 
Another variable of the perceived person that affects others per-
ception of him is wit. Goodchilds (1959) studied two types of humor, 
sarcastic wit and clowning wit, and their effects on perceived popular-
ity and power. Several written fictional conversations were examined 
by college students to validate the degree of funniness and the clarity 
of the humor type. After this preliminary step, other students were 
asked to rate the power and the popularity of the fictional characters. 
It was found that sarcastic wits were perceived as unpopular but power-
ful while clowning wits were perceived as popular but relatively 
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powerless. 
Jones, Hester, Farina, and Davis (1959) studied maladjustment ver-
sus adjustment in perceived persons. The study was designed such that 
two confederates evaluated the personality of one member of a subject 
pair. One confederate made derogatory remarks about the subject while 
the other was more noncommittal and mildly sympathetic. In one experi-
mental condition the derogator was identified as maladjusted and the 
noncommittal confederate was identified as well adjusted. In another 
condition the identifications were reversed. Results indicate that the 
targets of the derogation perceived the maladjusted derogator to be 
more likable than the well adjusted derogator. The well adjusted 
derogator was perceived by the target of the derogation to be more 
credible than the maladjusted derogator. The subject who was essen-
tially a bystander perceived the maladjusted derogator to be less 
likable than the target of the derogation did. Thus, it is evident that 
the label of maladjustment or adjustment affects the perception of one 
who is so labelled. 
A final study concerning perceived person variables was focused on 
the perception of nonmembers of groups (Fishbein, 1963). Specifically, 
this study was concerned with group members' perceptions of threat from 
nonmembers. Fishbein's results made it evident that the orientation 
of the nonmembers toward the group and the eligibility of nonmembers 
for group membership each strongly influenced the perception of threat 
in nonmembers by members. A distinction between continued nonmembers 
and exmembers did not affect the group members' perceptions of threat. 
Thus, the orientation and the eligibility of nonmembers affected person 
perception but membership history did not. This finding, of course, is 
only applicable to the limited area of the perception of threat from 
others. 
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Two factors concerning the relationship between the perceiver and 
the perceived have also been studied in the effects on other perception. 
The respect one person has for another has been investigated by Walster, 
Walster, Abrahams, and Brown (1966). This study looked specifically at 
the effect of erroneously given respect or disrespect on subsequent per-
ceptions of respectability. Some subjects in this study discovered 
that they had accorded another more respect than the other deserved. 
Other subjects discovered that they had accorded another less respect 
than the other deserved. Each of these conditions produced a temporary 
overcompensation for the error in the subsequent perception of the 
other's respectability. If the subject had given the other too little 
respect initially, he/she temporarily underestimated the other's re-
spectability. Thus, errors in respect given in a relationship with 
another cause subsequent over-correction in the form of an error in the 
opposite direction in perceived respectability. The second relation-
ship variable to be considered here is compatibility. Spolsky (1965) 
investigated FIRO-B compatibility between a doctor and his patient. 
Evidence resulted suggesting that compatibility had an effect on the 
way the patient perceived the doctor which had imp~ications for treat-
ment outcome effects. The studies of Walster, et al. (1966) and 
Spolsky (1965) indicate that other perception is affected by the rela-
tion of perceiver to perceived. 
Two other studies related to other perception but not specifically 
concerned with factors in the perceived person, the perceiver or their 
relationship have been done by Podell and Amster (1966) and Himmelfarb 
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(1972). Podell and Amster found that the more positive (or negative) 
information a subject had concerning a hypothetical other, the more 
polarized the subject's evaluation of the other became. Thus, the more 
consistently positive (or negative) information a person has about 
another the more his perception of the other will be polarized on the 
bad-good dimension. Himmelfarb also looked at the amount of information 
a perceiver had about another and at the source of this information. 
Two factors of the source of information proved to be important. First, 
for a given amount of information, the more sources that this informa-
tion was compiled from, the greater its effects on other perception. 
Secondly, the more diverse the situations in which a source had observ-
ed another, the greater the effect the information had on the perception 
of another. These two studies combine to indicate that the volume of 
consistent information, the diversity of the sources, and the diversity 
of the sources' observations each strongly influences how much a given 
amount of information will affect the perceptions of others. 
Before consideration of a third type of person perception, it 
should be noted that there is a very close relationship between other 
perception and feedback statements. In fact, feedback statements are 
merely a verbalization concerning a perception of a second party as seen 
in Table I. For this reason it is not unreasonable to entertain the 
hypothesis that therapy groups focusing on feedback statements may show 
person perceptual effects. One possible effect may be better accuracy. 
No literature concerning the determinants of third party percep-
tion, impersonal disclosure, was found. However, if the third party 
perceived is a person, the other perception literature would apply. 
A fourth type of person perception, one's perception of how others 
perceive one, has been shown to be quite important for social inter-
action. Goslin (1962) indicated that adolescent boys and girls who 
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were unable to accurately predict how their peers' perceived them, tend-
ed to be isolated from their peers. Thus, the lack of the ability to 
perceive how one is being perceived by others may cause one to be iso-
lated from others. It is possible, however, that isolates in this 
study were unable to perceive how others perceived them since their 
isolation tended to reduce the amount of information on which these per-
ceptions could be based. Not only has this type of person perception 
been shown to be related to the level of interpersonal interaction, but 
Kleinfeld (1972) found that it was also related to one's self-concept. 
This investigator studied black and white school children's academic 
self-concepts in relation to how they perceived their parents and 
teachers to perceive the children's academic selves. Results indicated 
that white children's self-concepts were more strongly related to their 
perception of their parents' perception of them than to their percep-
tion of their teacher's perception of them. For blacks, exactly the 
opposite was indicated except that this effect reached significance 
only for females. From this study it is clear that one's perceptions 
of others' perceptions of one is related to one's self-perception. 
Another interesting study which is indicative of the importance of this 
third type of person perception was completed by Broxton (1963). This 
study investigated the level of interpersonal attraction in college 
roommates. Results clearly indicated that interpersonal attraction is 
more closely related to how one perceives another's perception of one 
than to how another truly perceives one. Thus, one's perception of 
interpersonal reality is much more important than reality itself. In 
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sum, the studies of Goslin (1962), Kleinfeld (1972), and Broxton (1963) 
combine to indicate that this type of person perception is very impor-
tant for interpersonal interaction and for one's own self-perception. 
Several other studies have been done yielding interesting results 
pertinent for consideration here. Backman and Secord (1962) investi-
gated living groups and found that liked persons, to a significantly 
greater extent than disliked persons, were perceived as perceiving a 
person in a similar fashion as a person perceived him/herself. Thus, 
if a person liked another, the other was perceived as attributing to 
that person the same traits that he/she attributed to him/herself. In 
addition to the results found for liking versus disliking, identical 
results were found for frequent interaction versus infrequent inter-
action. Not only does one tend to see one's self-perception as con-
gruent to his/her perception of a liked (or frequently visited) person's 
perception of one but Deutsch and Soloman (1959) found that if one's 
self-perception is perceived to be congruent to another's perception of 
one, one tends to like the other more. In addition, these investigators 
found that when one's self-perception is perceived to be confirmed by 
another, one tends to think more of him/herself. A final investigation 
in this area (Sigal! and Landy, 1973) studied the effects of having an 
attractive romantic partner on college males' perceptions of how others 
perceived them. Subjects in this study predicted the impressions that 
raters would form of them. These subjects expected to be target per-
sons who, along with a female confederate (attractive or unattractive) 
would be presented to a rater as associated (boyfriend of the confed-
erate) or as unassociated. Subjects believed they would be perceived 
most favorably in the attractive-associated condition and believed they 
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would be perceived most unfavorably in the unattractive-associated con-
dition. Thus, it is likely that one's perceptions of others' percep-
tions of one is influenced by the attractiveness of one's associates. 
Although the first two types of person perception have had analo-
gous therapeutic verbalizations, one's perception of others' percep-
tions of one does not. It is possible that this is simply an oversight 
by those who study therapeutic verbiage. In pilot work for the present 
study, subjects were instructed to verbalize this type of self-empathy 
in an affective or evaluative manner. Eight subjects, four each in two 
separate group meetings, were unable to do this. Through discussing 
this inability with the subjects it was clear that although the task 
was understood intellectually, it was too intimate to perform. One 
subject indicated that he didn't even use this type of statement with 
his best friends and certainly could not do it with strangers in a 
psychology experiment. It may be that this pilot work has resulted in 
defining a type of self-disclosing statement that is found at the 
center of Lazarus' (1969) concentric circle conceptualization. 
The final type of person perception to be discussed here is a 
person's perception of another's self-perception, other empathy. Gray 
and Gaier (1974) investigated parents' and friends' perceptions of 
female high school seniors' self-perceptions. Single friends were 
found to have the greatest accuracy in their perceptions of the girls' 
self-perceptions but friends in general were more variable in their 
accuracy than parents' perceptions were. Both parents and friends were 
able to accurately accomplish this type of person perception but best 
friends were more accurate while parents were more consistently 
accurate than friends in general. 
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This type of person perception, a person's perception of another's 
self-perception, is related to one of the therapeutic verbalizations 
discussed above. Empathic expression is, at least in part, concerned 
with perceiving how another see's him/herself and with verbalizing this 
perception. This clearly involves an important type of empathic under-
standing. Since empathic expression is verbalization of a type of 
person perception, it is possible that therapy groups which focus on 
empathy may show evidence of person perceptual effects. 
No literature on impersonal empathy was available. However, if 
the third party is a person the other empathy literature found above 
would apply. 
Before I leave the area of person perception, an important article 
by Lorber (1973) should be considered. Lorber discussed three concepts 
important for person perception. Mutuality, the first concept consid-
ered by Lorber, concerns the question "Does a person perceive another 
as that other perceives him/her?" The author presented evidence that 
indeed social choice tends to be mutual which implies that both liking 
and disliking tend to be mutual. Lorber also presents evidence that 
mutuality is not always the case. For example, high status individuals 
are accepted by others more than they accept others; and social isolates 
accept others more than they are accepted. 
The second concept discussed by Lorber is accuracy, the degree to 
which a person can predict how others perceive him/her. Concerning 
accuracy, the author indicated that accepted children feel socially 
integrated and rejected children feel less socially integrated; those 
who are accepted tend to be aware of it; those who perceive themselves 
as being accepted generally are; leaders tend to underestimate their 
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acceptance by others; and isolates tend to overestimate their accep-
tance. In general, people tend to accurately perceive their acceptance 
although persons at the extreme levels of acceptance are likely to make 
perceptual errors. Lorber also discussed the situation when accuracy 
does not exist. If a person underestimated the level of acceptance 
from others he/she was likely to expect to receive less acceptance than 
he/she was willing to give and he/she was also likely to perceive him/ 
herself as not acceptable or accepting. If a person overestimates his/ 
her level of acceptance from others he/she is likely to expect more re-
ceived acceptance than they were willing to give; he/she is likely to 
perceive him/herself as acceptable and accepting; he/she is likely to 
perceive him/herself as more accepting than others thought them to be; 
and he/she tends to be less well adjusted than persons who underestimate 
their acceptance. 
Congruence is the final concept discussed in the Lorber article. 
This concept is the tendency for individuals to feel the same way about 
others as they perceive others to feel about them. Some explanations 
for congruence have been discussed. For example, an individual may re-
spond to a person who is perceived as liking him/her by reciprocating 
these feelings; an individual dislikes another and in an attempt to re-
duce guilt produced by this feeling, he/she tends to perceive the other 
as disliking him/her. 
Lorber asserted that mutuality, accuracy, and congruence are not 
independent but are strongly related. If two of these concepts are 
present the third must also be. This is due to the nature of the def-
initions of the concepts. This is readily apparent on inspection of 
the definitions for these concepts found in Appendix A. 
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Verbal Conditioning and the Interpersonal Realm 
Conditioning of verbal behavior ha$ been studied for decades. The 
·first studies concerning conditioning, extinction, and generalization 
of verbal behavior were done by Humphreys (1939) and Razran (1949). 
More recent experimentation (Greenspoon, 1951) concerning the condi-
tioning of verbal behavior seems to have stimulated a great deal of 
interest in the area. In his study, Greenspoon was able to modify the 
probability of occurrence of a response class of plural nouns by using 
verbal approval in the form of "nnnm-hmm," verbal disapproval in the 
form of "huh-uh," a light, and a tone as reinforcers. This early study 
led to other investigators studying the result of using a variety of 
reinforcers on a variety of verbal behaviors. Such approval responses 
as "mmm-hmm" (Ball, 1952; Greenspoon, 1951, 1955; Sarason, 1957; Mock, 
1957; Krasner, 1955, Salzinger and Pisoni, 1957(a), 1957(b); Wilson and 
Verplank, 1956), "good" (Binder, McConnell, and Sjoholm, 1957; Cohen, 
Kalish, Thurston, and Cohen, 1954; Ekman, 1957; Hartman, 1955; Hildum 
and Brown, 1956; Nuthmann, 1957; Taffe!, 1955; Tatz, 1956; Spivak and 
Papajohn, 1957; Fahmy, 1953), "that's accurate" (Kanfer, 1954), and 
paraphrasing the subject's response and agreeing with it with a smile 
(Verplank, 1955) have all been used to increase the frequency of a par-
ticular verbal response class. Other reinforcers such as a light 
(Greenspoon, 1951, 1955; Sidowski, 1954), a buzzer (Greenspoon, 1951), 
and a bell tone (McNair, 1957) have similarly been reported to yield 
increases in the frequency of usage of particular verbal response 
classes. Such nonverbal social reinforcers as head nods, smiles, and 
leaning forward (Wickes, 1956; Ekman, 1957) have also been used with 
positive res~lts! 
40 
Although many verbal conditioning studies have obtained positive 
results, some negative results have been reported. Repetition of the 
subject's response (Fahmy, 1953), "mmm-hmm" (Daily, 1953; Hildum and 
Brown, 1956), "good" (Marion, 1956; Daily, 1953), and "give another one, 
please" (Fahmy, 1953) have each been used as verbal reinforcers with 
negative results. Ball (1952), Nuthmann (1957), and Taffel (1955) used 
lights as reinforcers with negative results and Ball (1952) found that 
using a buzzer as reinforcement caused no increase in his target re-
sponse class. At least one nonverbal social reinforcer, the head nod, 
has been used with a population of schizophrenics with negative results 
(Hartmann, 1955). It seems then that the majority of research has ob-
tained results illustrating the efficacy of simple reinforcement tech-
niques in altering the frequency of a verbal response class. However, 
some negative results have also been reported, 
Some explanations for negative results have been presented by 
Spielberger and DeNike (1962) and by Mandler and Kaplan (1956). Spiel-
berger and DeNike concluded that their negative results were due to 
subjects being unaware of the reinforcement contingency, In fact, 
subjects lacking in awareness of the contingency did not differ signif-
icantly from controls in the frequency of usage of plural nouns. 
Mandler and Kaplan replicated the Greenspoon (1951) study obtaining 
negative results. These investigators concluded that subjects who in-
creased the frequency of the target response class interpreted the re-
inforcer as a positive sanction, while subjects who decreased the fre-
quency of the response class interpreted the reinforcer as a negative 
sanction. These studies suggest that awareness of the reinforcement 
contingency and awareness of the meaning of the reinforcer is essential 
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to effective verbal conditioning. 
Extinction, schedules of reinforcement, generalization, subject 
variables, and other topics pertinent to verbal conditioning have been 
studied extensively. This literature is so voluminous as to preclude 
comprehensive review in this paper. However, reviews of this litera-
ture (Williams, 1966; Krasner, 1958; Kanfer, 1968; Salzinger, 1959; 
Greenspoon, 1962; Holz and Azrin, 1966; Hersen, 1968) have been done 
elsewhere. Since the focus of this paper is the interpersonal realm, 
it is well to leave the general consideration of verbal conditioning. 
Several studies have been reported concerning verbal con.ditioni.n.g 
i.n an interpersonal setting. Oakes, Droge, and August (1960) presented 
a light each time one of their discussion group subjects responded with 
verbal content related to the topic of discussion, a. psychological case 
stuC.y. Half of the subjects were told that the light signified that 
their statement showed "psychological insight" while the other half 
were told that the light signified that their statement lacked this in-
sight. Results showed the "psychological insight" condition produced a 
high rate of verbal responsivity while the lacking insight condition 
produced hesitancy to speak. This finding indicated that a light may 
be used as a reinforcer in the group setting to alter verbal behavior. 
It also corroborated the assertion of Mandler and Kaplan (1956) that 
the meaning of the reinforcer is of extreme importance. 
Oakes, Droge, and August (1961) used a discussion setting similar 
to that used in their earlier study. Instead of discussing a psycholog-
ical case study, however, subjects discussed solutions to a problem to 
which there were three possible solutions. Reinforcement consisted of 
a light which was contingent upon making a statement that the authors 
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felt was likely to arrive at one preselected solution of the three pos-
sible. This conditioning technique produced an increase in the rate of 
emission of reinforceable responses over the thirty minute session. 
More surprising, perhaps, is that the subjects tended to choose the 
predetermined solution to the problem. Again, it is clear that rein-
forcement contingent on a verbal response class greatly effects verbal 
behavior in the group setting. 
Oakes (1962) again used a lightias a reinforcer in a discussion 
group to attempt to increase the frequency of occurrence of verbaliza-
tions falling into Bales' (1950) categories. As in the Oakes, Droge, 
and August (1960) study, the light signified that a subject's verbali-
zation had evidenced "psychological insight". Results were negative 
with the exception of a significant increase in emission of the "gives 
opinions" category. The author explained these results in terms of the 
extremely low operant rate of some of the categories prior to institu-
tion of the reinforcement contingency and in terms of many of the cate-
gories being obviously unrelated to the meaning of the reinforcer, 
Another study, (McNair, 1957) used a bell tone as a reinforcer con-
tingent on any verbalization of the subjects in his discussion group. 
A significant increase in the rate of verbalization was found asserting 
that verbal behavior can be modified in discussion groups by simple 
conditioning techniques. 
In a seminar-type situation, Cieutat (1959) used attention in the 
form of looking at his subjects with an occasional head nod to socially 
reinforce verbal behavior. Results indicated the total time spent 
speaking varied directly with attention and inversely with inattention. 
This study suggested that social reinforcers are useful in a discussion 
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setting as well as mechanical reinforcement. 
Not only has verbal behavior been modified by verbal conditioning 
in the discussion setting, it has been modified through similar methods 
in therapy groups. Hauserman, Zweback, and Plotkin (1972) used tokens 
to reward typically nonverbal hospitalized adolescents for verbaliza-
tions in a therapy group. Group members emitted a substantially higher 
rate of verbal interactions than prior to the institution of the token 
reinforcement. When awarding of tokens was stopped, the rate of verbal 
interaction decreased. 
Another study corroborating the efficacy of verbal conditioning 
using token reinforcement was done by Kruger (1971) using three groups 
of male adolescent delinquents. Reinforcement consisted of the flash 
of a light. Each reinforcement was tallied and could be used as a 
token in exchange for back up reinforcers such as candy. In one of the 
two experimental groups, reinforcement was controlled by the experimen-
ter and in the other group reinforcement was controlled by one of the 
subjects. In botp groups reinforcement was contingent on verbalization. 
A control group received random reinforcement. The peer reinforcement 
condition showed the highest rate of response total when compared to 
the control. Thus, these results provide further evidence that a token 
system can have a great effect on verbalization in group therapy. 
Studies have also indicated that social reinforcers can work in 
group therapy. Wagner (1966) studied one therapy group of hospitalized 
psychiatric patients. Half of the group's eight members were rein-
forced by "good," "uh-huh," or a head nod following every verbalizati<;m. 
The other patients were not reinforced. A significant difference in 
the rate of verbalization was found between the groups up until the 
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sixth session. The equalization of the response rate of the two condi-
tions after the sixth session was explained by the author in terms of 
each experimental condition occurring within the same group. Nonrein-
forced subjects may have received vicarious reinforcement or ~hey may 
have increased their verbalizations to limit the reinforcement the 
other patients could get. In any case, the study suggested that an in-
crease in verbalization can be achieved using social reinforcers in the 
therapy group. 
Another study indicating the effectiveness of verbal conditioning 
using social reinforcement in group therapy was done by Dinoff, Horner, 
Kurpiewski, Rickard, and Timmons (1960). These investigators reinforced 
two groups of hospitalized male schizophrenics for either group re-
sponses or for personal responses by attending to, reflecting, or 
approving of the subject's statement. Significant increases in the 
target responses were observed. 
Heckel, Wiggins, and Salzberg (1962) also studied verbal condi-
tioning in group psychotherapy. This study is of particular interest 
because of its use of negative reinforcement of verbalization. After 
any group silence of ten seconds or longer, these experimenters pre-
sented a noxious noise. With the first verbalization the noxious noise 
was terminated constituting negative reinforcement of verbal behavior. 
Verbalization was found to increase and silences were almost eliminated 
indicating the. effectiveness of negative reinforcement. 
A final technique of verbal conditioning in groups has been used 
by Fromme, Whisenant, Susky, and Tedesco (1974), Fromme and Close 
(1976), Fromme and Duvall (1977), and Fromme and Marcy (1976). These 
investigators seated four subjects in a semicircular arrangement around 
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a small table. Each subject faced a digital counter used to record the 
subject's verbalizations which fit one of five reinforceable categories. 
When reinforcement in the form of advancement of the digital counter 
was issued, an audible click was heard. In addition to the digital 
counters, red lights were used as negative reinforcers in a manner sim-
ilar to the use of noxious noise by Heckel, Wiggins, and Salzberg 
(1962). Whenever any subject fell ten or more counts behind the sub-
ject with the highest count, his red light was turned on. When he 
emitted enough reinforceable responses such that he was less than ten 
counts behind, his red light was turned off. The lights were also used 
as an informational cue to alert the subjects whenever three minutes 
had elapsed with no member of the group emitting a reinforceable re-
sponse. This was accomplished by a brief flash of all four lights. 
By utilizing this technique Fromme, et al. (1974) were able to in-
crease the level of emission of feeling statements, giving feedback, 
seeking feedback, clarifying the nature of another's affective state, 
and seeking information about another's current affective state in 
twelve groups of undergraduates. These investigators found that rein-
forcement techniques produced a level of response equal to that pro-
duced by therapists. The reinforcement technique, however, was viewed 
less positively by the subjects than was the therapist condition. 
Fromme and Close (1976) studied the effect of Fundamental Inter-
personal Relations Orientation - Behavior (Schutz, 1958) compatibility 
on the levels of occurrence of the same five verbal categories as in 
the Fromme, et al. study. In general, results indicated that compatible 
groups express more affective verbalizations than do incompatible 
groups. This study also corroborated the finding that these reinforce-
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ment procedures enhance· the number of affective verbalizations signifi-
cantly. 
Fromme and Marcy (1976) also utilized Fromme's method of verbal 
conditioning. The study indicated that the method could be used to in-
vestigate the effects of different modes of interpersonal interaction. 
Cohesiveness and self-disclosure were found to be related to the typi-
cal mode of interaction in groups. 
Fromme and Duvall (1977) indicated that the reinforcement tech-
nique was more effective in producing high levels of verbal response 
than was a control condition that merely instructed subjects to respond. 
For this reason, no instruction only control group was deemed necessary 
in the present study. 
Cohesiveness 
Group cohesiveness is an important dependent measure in the 
present study. It has long been considered an important aspect of 
group psychotherapy. Cohesiveness has been defined in a variety of 
ways. Festinger (1950) defined cohesiveness as the resultant of all 
forces acting on the members to remain in the group. The emphasis of 
Festinger's definition is clearly on the degree to which the group 
tends to cohere or stick together. This emphasis is also apparent in 
the definitions for cohesiveness forwarded by Berne (1963) and by Gross 
and Martin (1952). However, in each of these definitions, cohesiveness 
is seen as existing in opposition to a disruptive force. Berne (1963, 
p. 97) defines cohesiveness as "The force that opposes both pressure 
and agitation. " He indicated that agitarion is an internal threat 
to group existence. These writers define cohesiveness as the resistance 
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of a group to disruptive forces. 
A second common emphasis for cohesiveness definitions is the idea 
of group attractiveness or social satisfaction properties. For example, 
Frank (1957) defined cohesiveness as the attractiveness of a group for 
its members. Similarly, Lieberman, Yalom, and Miles (1973) suggested 
that group cohesiveness could be defined as a sum of individual attrac-
tion measures across all group members. 
The cohesiveness definition presented by Shaw (1971) combines both 
of the definitional components suggested above. His definition of the 
term is "the degree to which members of the group are attracted to each 
other, or the degree to which the group coheres or 'hangs together'" 
(Shaw, 1971, p. 192). 
Shaw also has summarized the definitions that have been used com-
monly in the social psychology literature. These are resistance to 
leaving the group, morale or level of motivation of group members, and 
coordination of the efforts of group members. Although these defini-
tions are seemingly related to the major ideas of social attractiveness 
and tendency to cohere, they are not identical. A final cohesiveness 
definition was presented by Landecker (1955). This study defined co-
hesiveness as the degree to which members conform to group norms. 
The multiplicity of different definitions for cohesiveness com-
prises a basis for questioning the plausibility of cohesivenss being a 
unitary concept. Festinger, Schacter, and Back (1950) assumed that 
cohesiveness was a unitary concept and treated it as such. A study by 
Smith (1970) indicated that cohesiveness was merely interpersonal 
attraction. Thus, it gave support to the unitary conception of cohe-
siveness. 
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The unitary conception of cohesiveness was questioned, however, by 
Gross and Martin (1952) who found that the three indicators they used 
to measure cohesiveness in thirteen women's living groups at a mid-
western university had very low or negative linear intercorrelations. 
Similar evidence was forwarded for a multifacited concept of cohesive-
ness in a study by Eisman (1959) who found that five indicators of co-
hesiveness also had very low or negative intercorrelations. The 
measures used in this study were the mean number of reasons for belong-
ing to the group as reported on Eisman's 21 item checklist, the number 
of items on this checklist checked by more than half the group, the mean 
rating for a group on a five point scale measuring how attractive the 
group was for each member, a sociometric rating, and the degree of homo-
geneity of group values. Of course, the evidence forwarded by Eisman 
and Gross and Martin may be due to inadequate cohesiveness measures 
rather than being due to the concept's multifaceted quality. Thus, the 
evidence forwarded here is merely suggestive rather than conclusive. 
Hagstrom and Selvin (1965) applied the factor analytic method to 
resolve the controversy between cohesiveness as a unitary concept and 
as a multifaceted one. Subjects were obtained from women's living 
groups at the University of California. Each subject responded to a 
nineteen-item questionnaire developed by the authors. When these data 
were analyzed, two orthogonal factors emerged. The factors were called 
social satisfaction and sociometric cohesion. Social satisfaction was 
related to social attraction to the group and satisfaction derived from 
social interaction in the group while sociometric cohesion was related 
to length of time in the group and a high number of group members as 
best friends. Hagstrom and Selvin's results tend to support definitions 
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of cohesiveness that include both the social attractiveness and the 
tendency to cohere dimensions. One such definition is the one offered 
by Shaw (1971). The cohesiveness measure in the present study taps both 
dimensions. 
Cohesiveness, although not always identically defined, has gener-
ally been considered a very important group parameter. For example, 
Shaw (1971) indicated that it is clear that cohesiveness is related to 
the quantity and the quality of group interaction. Cohesiveness brings 
cooperation and friendship into the group interaction. It also is re-
lated to high group influence on the individual and to the individual's 
satisfaction derived from the group. Low cohesiveness, according to 
Shaw, is related to independent functioning among group members and to 
a mutual lack of empathic concern. 
Other investigators have also concluded that cohesiveness plays 
other important roles in group interaction. Schacter (1951) found that 
high cohesiveness plays other important roles in group interaction. 
Schacter (1951) found that high cohesiveness is related to members 
striving to influence each other. Also, it has been reported by Cart-
wright and Zander (1962) that members of highly cohesive groups tend to 
be more influenced by the group than members of groups with low cohe-
siveness. Back (1951) learned that cohesive groups produce members who 
were more willing to listen to each other. Rassmussen and Zander (1954) 
reported that group members were more accepting of other group members 
in cohesive groups than members of non-cohesive groups. Members of 
highly cohesive groups were also found to experience more security and 
tension relief in their groups than members of groups without cohesive-
ness (Seashore, 1954). Members of cohesive groups participate readily 
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in group activities (Rassmussen and Zander, 1954; Goldstein, Heller, 
and Sechrest, 1966). Cohesive group norms are protected more readily 
than norms in less cohesive groups (Schachter, 1951; Zander and Havelin, 
1962). The cohesive group is much less susceptible to disruption due 
to a member leaving the group than a group with low cohesiveness (Gold-
stein, Heller, and Sechrest, 1966). Each of the above studies clearly 
asserts that cohesiveness is a very pertinent factor in developing many 
positive qualities in group settings. 
Besides its importance for groups in general, cohesiveness is es-
pecially important in group psychotherapy. Yalom (1970) indicated that 
cohesiveness is particularly important for attendance, participation, 
mutual helping, and maintenance of group therapy norms. He maintained 
that cohesiveness is a necessary precondition for effective group 
therapy, thereby indicating the tremendous importance he attaches to 
cohesiveness. Bednar and Lawlis (1971) concurred with Yalom's estimate 
of the significance of cohesiveness for group therapy. They indicated 
that cohesiveness represents a parameter of group atmosphere that is 
essential to effective treatment. 
Yalom (1970, pp. 65-71) reported an unpublished study in which he 
collaborated with Tinklenberg and Gilula concerning group therapy 
patients' views of the importance of several curative factors. These 
investigators studied twenty well educated, middle class, outpatients 
with neurotic or characterological disorders. The subjects had all been 
rated successful cases after eight to twenty-two months of group 
therapy. All subjects were asked to rate the relative importance of 
altruism, cohesiveness, universality, interpersonal learning, guidance, 
catharsis, identification, family re-enactment, insight, instillation 
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of hope, and existential factors in their successful group experience. 
It was found that subjects chose cohesiveness as the third most impor-
tant curative factor. 
A second study (Dickoff and Lakin, 1963) corroborated the finding 
that patients view cohesiveness as a highly important part of the group 
therapy experience. Dickoff and Lakin used tapes of members of their 
therapy groups explaining the curative factors that they had experienc-
ed in their therapy groups. The authors classified each statement and 
found that their patients believed that cohesiveness was of major ther-
apeutic importance. In the same study, results indicated that patients 
who experienced the group as cohesive attended more sessions, had more 
social contact with the other members, and judged the group as having 
offered a therapeutic experience. The authors concluded that cohesive-
ness is in itself of therapeutic value and is essential for the perpet-
. uation of the group. 
Miles (1965) measured the relationship between cohesiveness and 
outcome in group therapy. Subjects for this study were members of 
eighteen encounter groups composed of undergraduates. Cohesiveness was 
measured by a questionnaire and outcome was measured by a group yield 
score determined by summing each group member's change score, the re-
sultant of summing the subject's change on a number of outcome measures. 
Miles' data indicated a strong association between high cohesiveness 
and high group yield. Thus, it would seem probable that group cohesive-
ness is important for therapeutic gain in the group setting. 
The studies presented above point to the extreme importance of co-
hesiveness in groups in general and in therapy groups in particular. 
It seems that if a group therapy medium is to have efficacy it must 
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provide a way to encourage, enhance, and promote the development of co-
hesiveness. Without this powerful factor a therapy group is certain to 
be less efficient in achieving its therapeutic goals. It is question-
able whether or not success in group therapy is possible without cohe-
siveness. Thus, in the study of groups it is always important to in-
vestigate cohesiveness. 
The Present Study 
The present study was an attempt to discover the relative efficacy 
of six types of verbalizations on producing group cohesiveness, enjoy-
ment, meaningfulness, the tendency to self-disclose, and empathy. It 
was felt that there might be relatively low levels of each of these 
variables in the less intimate categories when compared to the more 
intimate categories. It was assumed that the intimacy of the condi-
tions was ordered from least intimate to most intimate as follows: 
nonaffective self-disclosure, impersonal disclosure, other disclosure 
(feedback), self-disclosure, impersonal empathy, and other empathy. It 
was predicted that the reinforcement data would make this assumption 
tenable. Finally, several person perception variables were analyzed 




Subjects were 72 undergraduate students enrolled in an introductory 
psychology course at Oklahoma State University. Subjects volunteered 
for the experiment to receive minimal class credit by signing their name 
on a sheet of paper handed out by the course instructor. Each sheet had 
spaces for only four names so each sheet represented one group. Sub-
jects were asked not to place their names on the sheet if they knew 
anyone whose name already appeared on that sheet. In this way groups 
with no previous acquaintanceship except minimal class contact were 
formed. Sex was held constant over all groups by composing each group 
of two males and two females. 
Eighteen groups were formed by this method. Three of the groups 
were assigned randomly to each of six experimental conditions in which 
four types of disclosure and two types of empathy were the verbal re-
sponse categories. These categories will be defined later in this 
chapter. 
Each subject received a telephone call from the experimenter prior 
to his/her group meeting to remind him/her of the time and place of the 




The experimental room was a reasonably comfortable eleven by 
twelve foot room with a one-way mirror situated in one of the twelve 
foot walls. Subjects were seated around a small table. Each session 
was monitored by the experimenter via the one-way mirror and a micro-
phone on the small table. A four channel relay control panel was used 
to record those instances where the experimenter judged that a group 
member's statement fit one of the reinforceable categories. A digital 
counter was located on the table in front of each subject. When rein-
forcement was given, the digital counter placed in front of the appro-
priate subject was advanced producing an audible click. A red light 
located on top of each subject's counter was also used to provide two 
types of informational cues. First, all four lights were automatically 
flashed by an interval timer whenever no subject received a reinforce-
ment for a period of three minutes. This feedback was used to help 
direct the group's attention toward the emission of the appropriate re-
sponse category. Second, an individual's red light was turned on when-
ever that subject was more than ten counts behind the subject with the 
most counts. The light remained lit until that subject brought the 
difference between his count and the highest count to less than ten. 
Response Categories 
A set of six verbal response categories was defined as follows: 
1. Nonaffective or demographic self-disclosure was defined as any 
statement provi~ing information about the self if no fe~ling about the 
information is expressed. 
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2. Impersonal disclosure was defined as any statement expressing 
a feeling about or evaluating something external to the self. 
3. Self-disclosure was defined as any statement expressing a 
feeling about or evaluating the self. 
4. Other disclosure (feedback) was defined as any other-referred 
statement expressing feelings about or evaluating another group member. 
5. Impersonal empathy was defined as any statement concerning what 
one thinks another group member feels about something external to the 
group member's self. 
6. Other empathy was defined as any statement concerning what one 
thinks another group member feels about him/herself. 
Intersubjective reliability of these response categories was deter-
mined prior to the experiment proper by independent ratings of state-
ments issued by the 20 members of five groups. These subjects received 
the same treatment as used in the experiment proper. Each group session 
was tape recorded so that an independent judge could later determin.e 
which of the statements issued by these groups fit the appropriate cate-
gory. In this way the percentage of a.greement between the experimenter 
and the judge could be. determir..ed. These percentages of agreement are 
found in. Table: II. 
Another type of reliability data was also collected concerning the 
response categories. This was the percen.t agreement between two judges 
using all the response categories simultaneously. This percentage was 
found to be 95. 
TABLE II 
PERCENT OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN TWO JUDGES 

























Each group met separately for one seventy minute session. Each 
session was divided into ten minutes of free conversation, ten minutes 
of warm up and verbal instruction, and fifty minutes of verbal condi-
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tioning. Before each session, subjects were told to engage in free con-
versation to allow the experimenter to see in what way free conversation 
differs from conversation with the use of the experimental apparatus 
(Appendix B). The experimenter then proceeded behind the one-way mirror 
and monitored the group's conversation for ten minutes. After this 
period, the experimenter re-entered the room in which the subjects were 
conversing and proceeded to conduct a warm-up exercise and give them 
more verbal instructions (Appendix B). At this time subjects were also 
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given a card on which a written statement concerning the appropriate 
verbal response category for their group was described (Appendix B). 
For the purpose of this experiment, it was explained that it was de-
sirable for each subject to express as many statements of this type as 
he/she could. Illustrative examples of the appropriate verbal category 
were presented and discussed with the group (Appendix B). Subjects 
were also given an explanation of the apparatus. 
At the end of each free conversation period the experimenter re-
corded the number of instances of the appropriate type of verbal re-
sponse for each subject. During the verbal conditioning session the 
experimenter recorded the number of reinforceable responses issued by 
each subject in each of the five ten minute periods. Following each 
session, subjects responded to a cohesiveness measure (Appendix C), a 
meaningfulness measure (Appgendix C), an enjoyment measure (Appendix C), 
a group perceptions test (Appendix F), a self-disclosure measure (Appen-
dix D), and an empathy measure (Appendix E). From the group perceptions 
test 14 measures were taken (Appendix A). 
CHAPTER III 
RESULTS 
All the data collected in the present study is found in Appendix 
G and the nonsignificant analyses are found in Appendix H. 
Response Category Data 
The first question that needed to be answered in the present study 
was, "Does the conditioning procedure work?" This question was answered 
in two ways. First, six planned comparisons were computed which com-
pared the mean of the six types of verbal responses in the free conver-
sation period with the mean of each type during the conditioning pro-
cedure. The F ratios resulting from these comparisons are found in 
Table III. 
Table III and inspection of the data in Appendix G makes it immedi-
ately clear that the reinforcement procedure used in this study produced 
more verbal responses of the target category than were issued by the 
subjects in the free conversation. In this sense, the conditioning pro~ 
cedure has significant effectiveness. 
A second statistical method was used to answer the question of the 
reinforcement procedure's efficacy. An analysis of variance procedure 
was used on the number of responses of each of the six types issued. 
The analysis of variance summary table for nonaffective self~disclosure 
responses issued in each of the six treatments is found in Table IV. 
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TABLE III 
COMPARISONS OF FREE CONVERSATION RESPONSES 
WITH CONDITIONING RESPONSES 
Category 
Nonaffective Self-disclosure 16.70* 
Impersonal Disclosure 106.65* 
Self-disclosure 67.42* 
Other Disclosure (Feedback) 25.27* 
Impersonal Empathy 15.88* 
Other Empathy 7.02* 





*p ~ .05 
TABLE IV 




Freedom Square Error Term 
5 1890.78 Pooled Groups 
and Subjects 








The significance of the treatment F ratio was analyzed further by utili-
zation of the Newman-Keuls method for making multiple pairwise compari-
sons. The results of this procedure and the mean number of nonaffective 
self-disclosure responses in each condition is found in the first row 
of Table V. Inspection of Table IV and the first row of Table V is in-
dicative of the conditioning procedure's effectiveness in producing non-
affective self-disclosure responses. More of these responses were pro-
duced when the target category was the nonaffective self-disclosure 
response than in any other condition. Finally, no group effect was ob-
served in the nonaffective self-disclosure condition. 
An analysis of variance similar to the one above was computed for 
the impersonal disclosure responses. It is found in Table VI. The sig-
nificance of the treatments F ratio was analyzed further by utilization 
of the Newman-Keuls method. These results are found in the second row 
of Table V. Thus, more impersonal disclosure responses were issued 
when the target category was impersonal disclosure than in any other 
condition. All other conditions were not essentially different. This 
again asserts that the conditioning procedure is effective. No signif-
icant group effect was found. 
The analysis of variance for the other disclosure (feedback) re-
sponses is found in Table VII. The significance of the treatments F 
ratio w~s ~nalyzed further by the Newman-Keuls method. The mean number 
of other disclosure (feedback) responses in each experimental condition 
are found in the third row of Table V. Significantly more other dis-
closure (feedback) responses were issued when other di~closure (feed-
back) was the target category than in any of the other conditions. All 





1. Nonaffective 73.75a 
Self-disclosure 
2. Impersonal 21. 25a 
Disclosure 
3. Other Disclosure .75a 
(Feedback) 
4. Self-disclosure 1.42a 
1.42c 
5. Impersonal 2.08a 
Empathy 
6. Other Empathy .67a 
TABLE V 




Disclosure (Feedback) Self-disclosure 
45.83b 41. 75b 38.42b 
58.50b 33.25a. 35.00a 
2.08a 19.33b 2.67a 
2.92a 3.58a 10. 58b 
3.25a 3.42a 2.08a 











a,b,c,d indicate, within each row, groups of means that are different from one another 























*p $ . 05 
Degrees 
of Mean 
Freedom Square Error Term 
5 1816.91 Pooled Groups 
and Subjects 
12 365.35 Subjects 
54 232.91 
TABLE VII 




Freedom Square Error Term 
5 594.59 Groups 
12 29.93 Subjects 
54 11.17 










The F ratio for groups in Table VII ¥as also significant. For this 
reason no pooling of grouP,s and subjects variance was possible. No fur-
ther analysis was required since groups is a random factor. This F 
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ratio is indicative of one or more groups issuing significantly more 
other disclosure (feedback) responses than at least one other group. 
The probable cause for this groups effect is that one subject in a 
group had a marked effect in influencing the entire group's response 
rate. This is likely since the red lights used tended to keep subjects 
within ten counts of each other. The effect of one subject in a group 
"pulling" that group's rate of response to very high levels might be 
termed a "bootstrap" effect. 
An analysis of variance table for self-disclosure responses is 
found in Table VIII. 
TABLE VIII 
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE FOR SELF-DISCLOSURE 
Degrees 
of Mean F 
Source Freedom Square Error Term Ratio 
Treatments 5 154.90 Groups 4.51* 
Groups 12 34.37 Subjects 2.51* 
Subjects 54 13.68 
*p $ • 05 
The mean number of self-disclosure responses issued in each condition 
and the results of the Newman-Keuls procedure are found in row four of 
Table V. It is clear that the conditioning procedure, where self-
disclosure is the response category, enhances the rate of self-
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disclosure responses significantly more than any other condition. Again 
we have evidence that the conditioning procedure is effective. However, 
the other conditions were not equa1 in producing self-disclosure re-
sponses. The other empathy condition produced significantly more self-
disclosure responses than the nonaffective self-disclosure condition 
and the impersonal empathy condition. A significant group effect was 
noted indicating that the groups were not all equal in their feedback 
production. 
The analysis of variance for the impersonal empathy responses is 
found in Table IX. 
TABLE IX 
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE FOR IMPERSONAL EMPATHY 
Degrees 
of Mean F 
Source Freedom Square Error Term Ratio 
Treatments 5 87.12 Pooled Groups 7.91* 
and Subjects 
Groups 12 8.67 Subjects .75 
Subjects 54 11.55 
*p ~ .05 
The mean number of impersonal empathy responses in each condition and 
the results of the Newman-Keuls procedure are found in row five of Table 
V. Inspection of Table Vis indicative of the conditioning procedure's 
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enhanced number of impersonal empathy responses when th±s verbal cate-
gory was the target response. None of the other conditions were sig-
nificantly different from one another in their level of impersonal 
empathy responses. In addition, no significant group effect was found. 
Finally, the analysis of variance for the other empathy responses 
is found in Table X. 
TABLE X 
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE FOR OTHER EMPATHY 
Degrees 
of Mean F 
Source Freedom Square Error Term Ratio 
Treatments 5 25.65 Pooled Groups 9.19* 
and Subjects 
Groups 12 1.97 Subjects .66 
Subjects 54 2.98 
*p < . 05 
The mean number of other empathy responses in each condition and the 
results of the Newman-Keuls procedure is found in row six of Table V. 
These results indicate that the conditioning procedure enhanced the num-
ber of other empathy r~sponses when other empathy was the target cate-
gory more than any other condition. None of the other conditions were 
different from one another in their level of other empathy production. 
No significant group effect was found. 
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In sum, the results above clearly show that the reinforcement pro-
cedure increased the level of the target verbal category when compared 
to a free discussion condition and when compared to conditions rein-
forcing other verbal targets. Thus, the procedure is clearly effective. 
Another analysis, found in Table XI was completed on the rein-
forcement data only. This analysis splits the 50 minute reinforcement 
period into five ten-minute periods as can be seen in Appendix G. The 
significant treatments F ratio was analyzed further by the Newman-Keuls 
procedure. The treatment means and the results of the Newman-Keuls 
procedure are found in Table XII. 
TABLE XI 
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE FOR REINFORCED RESPONSES 
Degrees 
of Mean F 
Source Freedom Square Error Term Ratio 
Treatments 5 2304.80 Groups 39.18* 
Periods 5 123.50 Periods by Groups 9.35* 
Groups 12 58.83 Subjects 6.13* 
Treatments 25 28.76 Periods by Groups 2.18* 
by Periods 
Subjects 54 9.60 
Period by 60 13.21 Periods by Subjects 2.67* 
Groups 
Period by 270 4.95 
Subjects 
*p :$ • 05 
Treatment 
TABLE XII 























These results indicate that nonaffective self-disclosure was used at a 
significantly higher rate during the conditioning procedure than each 
of the other categories. Impersonal disclosure was used at a higher 
rate than any other category except nonaffective self-disclosure. 
These results indicate that nonaffective self-disclosure and impersonal 
disclosure were easier categories to use than the others. 
The significant periods F ratio found in Table XI was also 
analyzed with the Newman-Keuls method. The period means and the Newman-







MEAN REINFORCED RESPONSES PER SUBJECT AVERAGED 
OVER THE RESPONSE CATEGORIES 
IN EACH PERIOD 
First Second Third Fourth 
Ten Ten Ten Ten 
Minutes Minutes Minutes Minutes 





a, b indicate groups of means that are significantly different 
beyond the .05 level 
Table XIII and the treatments F ratio in Table XI provide evid~nce that 
the conditioning procedure is effective when considered generally over 
all the treatments. It generally increases the number of reinforceable 
statements when compared to the free conversation. No significant dif-
ferences in response rate occurred among the five ten-minute reinforce-
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ment periods. 
A significant treatment by periods interaction is also found in 
Table XI. To analyze this effect the simple main effects of periods 
within treatments were computed. The F ratios for these simple main 
effects are found in Table XIV. 
TABLE XIV 
MEAN SQUARES AND F RATIOS FOR 
PERIOD WITHIN TREATMENTS 
SIMPLE MAIN EFFECTS 
Treatment Sum of Squares 
Nonaffective Self-disclosure 73.05 
Impersonal Disclosure 122.45 
Other Disclosure (Feedback) 47.7 
Self-disclosure 14.53 
Impersonal Empathy 1.83 
Other Empathy 7.93 







+nspection of Table XIV indicates that only three of the treat-
ments show a p~riod or a reinforcement effect. This at first seems to 
contradict the results of the planned comparisons listed earlier. This 
seeming contradiction may be explained as follows. When one considers 
the means in Table XII, it is clear that many more responses were 
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issued in the nonaffective disclosure condition, and the impersonal dis-
closure condition than were issued in the other categories. Since there 
were more responses in these categories, there was the possibility for 
much more variability. Thus~ these two conditions contributed largely 
to the mean square error for the simple main effects (periods by groups) 
while the other conditions with less possible variability contributed 
much less. This results in an inflated error term which makes any sig-
nificant results impossible to obtain in any treatment with a very low 
rate of response. For this reason the planned comparisons above which 
compare each treatment reinforcement effect against an error term de-
rived solely within that treatment is a more appropriate statistical 
procedure. 
Finally, Table XI contains a significant group effect and a signif-
icant period by group interaction. The first result indicates that one 
or more groups produced significantly higher rates of response than 
another group. The second result is similar except that the effect is 
within one or more periods, not over the entire session. These effects 
need not be analyzed further since each is a random factor. Again, 
these group effects might be the result of the "boot strap" effect. 
A final statistical procedure reanalyzed the response category 
data from a slightly different vantage point. This particular analysis 
looks at the other disclosure (feedback) condition, the other empathy 
condition, the impersonal disclosure condition, and the impersonal 
empathy condition as they relate to metaperception versus perception 
and other referred versus third party referred (see Table I). Other 
disclosure (feedback) responses are other referred statements of direct 
perception while other empathy responses are other referred statements 
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of metaperception. Impersonal disclosure responses are third party re-
ferred statements of metaperception. Thus, the four treatments may be 
seen as constituting a 2 X 2 factorial design where the two factors are 
metaperception versus perception and other referred versus third party 
referred. The analysis of variance table for this conceptualization 
using nonaffective self-disclosure responses found no significant re-
sults. This analysis is found in Table XXXII in Appendix H. 
This is evidence that the metaperception versus perception and the 
other versus third party variables and their interaction do not signif-
icantly affect the rate of nonaffective self-disclosure responses. 
This may be, in part, due to a ceiling effect caused by the high rate 
of nonaffective self-disclosure responses. In addition, no group effect 
was found. 
The same conceptualization was also used for the self-disclosure 
responses in Table XV. A significant group effect was in evidence 
which indicated one or more groups produced significantly more self-
disclosure statements than did another group. This effect is not an 
instance of the "boot strap" effect since self-disclosure was not rein-
forced in these data. 
The reader may also note the strong, but nonsignificant other 
versus third party factor F ratio. However, if one accepts the pool-
ing subjects and groups variance to form the error term for the other 
versus third party F ratio, the F ratio reaches significance (F1 66 = 
' 
5.64, p ~ .05). Pooling is at least marginally tenable since the 
groups F ratio is not extremely large. This F ratio, the other mean 
(5.13), and the third party mean (2.13), may be taken cautiously as 
evidence that verbalizing concerning another group member produced more 
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self-disclosure than did verbalizing concerning a third party regardless 
of metaperception versus perception. No significant perceptual effect 









*p ~ .05 
TABLE XV 




Freedom Square Error Term 
1 108.00 Groups 
Pooled Groups 
and Subjects 
Versus 1 6.75 Groups 
Pooled Groups 
and Subjects 
1 65.33 Groups 
Pooled Groups 
and Subjects 











It would be possible to use this same conceptualization for each 
of the remaining four types of responses [other disclosure (feedback), 
other empathy, impersonal empathy, impersonal empathy] and in fact the 
author performed these analyses. The results, however, were strictly 
redundant information merely reconfirming the reinforcement effect seen 
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in Table V. For this reason, these analyses will be omitted. 
Jourard's Self-disclosure Questionnaire Data 
An analysis of variance for the Self-disclosure Questionnaire Data 
is found in Table XXXIII in Appendix H. As is readily ascertained from 
the F ratios in Table XXXIII no significant tendency for a treatment 
effect or a group effect is found. Thus, the experimental conditions 
of the present study did not affect subjects' responses to the self-
disclosure measure. 
The self-disclosure concept has often been related to intimacy as 
is reported in the literature review. It is the author's belief that 
the present response categories also vary on the intimacy dimension. 
Specifically the nonaffective self-disclosure and the impersonal dis-
closure categories appear to be lacking in intimacy while the self-
disclosure, other disclosure (feedback), impersonal empathy and other 
empathy conditions appear more intimate. This is corroborated by the 
ease of use of the response categories data found in the treatments F 
ratio in. Table XI. To analyze this intimacy effect planned comparisons 
were computed which are found in Table XVI. 
The planned comparison data indicate that indeed the intimacy di-
mensi.on has its effects on the subjects' responses to the self-disclo-
sure questionnaire. This effect can be further analyzed by inspection 
of the self-disclosure questi.onn.aire means in Table XVII. A signifi-
cantly stronger tendency to self-disclose is found in the intimate 
treatments as compared to the nonaffective self-disclosure and the im-
personal disclosure conditions but only when the intimate treatments are 
considered :in aggrega.te. No significan.t difference in self-disclosure 
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is in evidence when the intimate treatments are considered separately. 
TABLE XVI 
PLANNED COMPARISONS FOR SELF-DISCLOSURE 
QUESTIONNAIRE DATA 
Comparison 
Nonaffective Self-disclosure and Impersonal Disclosure 
versus Self-disclosure, Other Disclosure (Feedback), 
Impersonal Empathy, and Other Empathy 
Nonaffective Self-disclosure and Impersonal Disclosure 
versus Self-disclosure 
Nonaffective Self-disclosure and Impersonal Disclosure 
versus Other Disclosure (Feedback) 
Nonaffective Self-disclosure and Impersonal Disclosure 
versus Impersonal Empathy 
Nonaffective Self-disclosure and Impersonal Disclosure 
versus Other Empathy 
*p ~ .05 






Finally, the conceptualization discussed above concerning the 
other versus third party referred factor, the metaperception versus 
perception factor, and their interaction was applied to the self-
disclosure data in Table XVIII. Only a slight tendency is found in 
Table XVIII which may be interpreted only with the greatest of caution. 
The direct perception self-disclosure mean is 30.92 while the metaper-
ception self-disclosure mean is 36.38. These means and the F ratio 
























disclosure questionnaire in the metaperceptual conditions. No other 
significant results were obtained. 
TABLE XVIII 
TWO FACTOR ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE FOR 
SELF-DISCLOSURE QUESTIONNAIRE DATA 
Degrees 
of Mean F 
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Source Freedom Square Error Term Ratio 
Other Versus 1 77.52 Pooled Groups .70 
Third Party and Subjects 
Metaperception Versus 1 357.52 Pooled Groups 3.23a 
Perception and Subjects 
Interaction 1 38.52 Pooled Groups .35 
and Subjects 
Groups 8 76.96 Subjects .65 
Subjects 36 117.99 
a p~ .10 
Elm's Empathy Data 
All the analyses performed for the self-disclosure data were per-
formed for the rest of the Elm's empathy data and the other question-
naire data. These analyses for the Elm's empathy data are found in 
Appendix H. Neither the treatments nor the groups factor accounted 
for a significant portion of variance in the data (Table XXXIV). There 
was no significant intimacy effect in the Elm's empathy data (Table 
XXXV). The two factor reanalysis of the data provided evidence that 
none of the experimental sources of variance found account for a sig-
nificant portion of the variance in the Elm's Empathy data (Table 
XXXVI). 
Group Attractiveness Item 
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Inspection of the group attractiveness data in Appendix G indicates 
that in general all experimental conditions produced a high rating of 
attractiveness. The overall mean was 3.74. No differential treatment 
or group effects were found in the one factor analysis of the data 
(Table XXXVII, Appendix H). 
Table XIX provides evidence that may be tentatively interpreted. 
The nonaffective self-disclosure attractiveness mean (3.67) coupled with 
the impersonal disclosure mean (3.50) were significantly different from 
the impersonal empathy condition mean (4.00) beyond the .10 level. No 
other planned comparisons were significant. The two factor analysis of 
the data (Table XXXVIII, Appendix H) provided no evidence that an exper-
imental effect accounted for a significant portion of the variance in 
the attractiveness data. 
Tendency to Cohere Item 
No significant results were obtained in the tendency to cohere 
item data. The analyses performed are found in Appendix H, Tables 
XXXIX, XL, and XLI. Inspection of the tendency to cohere data indicates 
that all conditions produced moderately high levels of the tendency to 
cohere. The overall mean was 3.69. 
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TABLE XIX 
PLANNED COMPARISONS FOR ATTRACTIVENESS ITEM 
Comparison F1 , 66 Ratio 
Nonaffective Self-disclosure and Impersonal Disclosure 
versus Self-disclosure, Other Disclosure (Feedback), 
Impersonal Empathy, and Other Empathy 
Nonaffective Self-disclosure and Impersonal Disclosure 
versus Self-disclosure 
Nonaffective Self-disclosure and Impersonal Disclosure 
versus Other Disclosure (Feedback) 
Nonaffective Self-disclosure and Impersonal Disclosure 
versus Impersonal Empathy 
Nonaffective Self-disclosure and Impersonal Disclosure 
versus Other Empathy 






No significant results were obtained in the analyses of variance 
of the meaningfulness data found in Tables XLII and XLIII in Appendix 
H. Generally, all conditions were rated as quite meaningful. The 
overall mean rating was 3.67. The planned comparisons in Table XX 
suggest, at least tentatively, that the other empathy condition was 
thought to be more meaningful than the nonaffective self-disclosure 
condition coupled with the impersonal disclosure condition. 
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TABLE XX 
PLANNED COMPARISONS FOR MEANINGFULNESS ITEM 
Comparison F1 66 Ratio , 
Nonaffective Self-disclosure and Impersonal Disclosure 
versus Sel{-disclosure, Other Disclosure (Feedback), 
Impersonal Empathy, and Other Empathy 
Nonaffective Self-disclosure and Impersonal Disclosure 
versus Self-disclosure 
Nonaffective Self-disclosure and Impersonal Disclosure 
versus Other Disclosure (Feedback) 
Nonaffective Self-disclosure and Impersonal Disclosure 
versus Impersonal Empathy 
Nonaffective Self-disclosure and Impersonal Disclosure 
versus Other Empathy 
a p ~ .10 





No significant results were obtained in any of the analyses per-
formed on the enjoyment data. The analyses are found in Tables XLIV, 
XLV, and XLVI in Appendix H. Inspection of the enjoyment data in 
Appendix G indicates that all conditions were generally rated very 
positively. The mean enjoyment rating was 4.07. 
Person Perception Data 
The intercorrelation matrix for the 14 person perception variables 
collected in the present study is found in Table XXI. 
TABLE XXI 
INTERCORRELATIONS OF PERSON PERCEPTION VARIABLES** 
PERSON 
PERCEPTION 
VARIABLE osv ov sov SA SE CG A E IO N CF PO FO PS 
osv 1.00 . 86* .34* -.03 . 01 -.35* -.05 . 07 .04 -.22 -.15 .01 -.07 -.39* 
ov 1.00 .38* -.04 .10 -.35* -.06 .17 -.02 -.21 -.10 -.00 -.10 -.29* 
sov 1.00 -.08 -.07 -.46* -.10 .01 -.01 -.21 -.12 -.16 .02 -.24* 
SA 1.00 .37* .29* .92* .48* .55* .30* .48* .61* .46* .32* 
SE 1.00 .03 .33* .84* .48* .82* ,42* ,28* .26* .20* 
CG 1.00 .34* -.00 .12 .37* .04 .18 .34* .65* 
A 1.00 .43* .50* .29* .44* .66* .46* .35* 
E 1.00 .64* .42* .55* .32* .29* .20* 
IO 1.00 .41* .69* .36* .51* .11 
N 1.00 .38* .16 .16 .45* 
CF 1.00 .27* .31* .04 
PO 1.00 .54* .31* 
FO 1.00 .36* 
i?S 1.00 
* p ~ .05 




The person perception variables were analyzed with the analysis of 
variance procedure. The significant results are found in Table XXII 
and Table XXIV. Nonsignificant results are found in Table XLVII and 







SIGNIFICANT ANALYSES OF VARIANCE FOR THE 
PERSON PERCEPTION VARIABLES 
Degrees 
of Mean 
Source Freedom Square Error Term 
Treatments 5 . 35 Groups 
Pooled Groups 
and Subjects 
Groups 12 .60 Subjects 
Subjects 54 .15 
Treatments 5 .21 Groups 
Pooled Groups 
and Subjects 
Groups 12 .32 Subjects 
Subjects 54 .79 
Treatments 5 .18 Groups 
Pooled Groups 
and Subjects 
Groups 12 .27 Subjects 













TABLE XXII (CONTINUED) 
Degrees 
of Mean F 
Variable Source Freedom Square Error Term Ratio 
Interpersonal Treatments 5 .21 Groups .63 
Openness Pooled Groups 2.09 
and Subjects 
Groups 12 .32 Subjects 6. 72* 
Subjects 54 .48 
Naivete Treatments 5 .10 Groups .23 
Pooled Groups .44 
and Subjects 
Groups 12 .41 Subjects 2.31* 
Subjects 54 .18 
Conformity Treatments 5 .43 Groups 2.67 
Pooled Groups 8.52* 
and.Subjects 
Groups 12 .16 Subjects 6.21* 
Subjects 54 .03 
Personal Treatments 5 .18 Groups .65 
Openness Pooled Groups 1.10 
and Subjects 
Groups 12 .27 Subjects 1.98* 
Subjects 54 .14 
Felt Openness Treatments 5 .02 Groups .08 
Pooled Groups .22 
and Subjects 
Groups 12 .28 Subjects 4.58* 
Subjects 54 . 06 
*p s .OS 
Rl 
Inspection of Table XXII indicates that the groups factor account-
ed for a significant portion of the variance in the stereotype accuracy 
data, the accuracy data, the empathy data, the interpersonal openness 
data, the yaivete data, the conformity data, the personal openness data, 
I 
and the fe~t openness data. No further analysis of this data need be 
I 
' 
done since groups is a random factor. These results assert that some 
groups scored significantly higher than other groups on the person per-
ception variables listed above. 
The only other significant result in Table XXII is found for the 
conformity data when pooled groups and subjects is the error term. For 
this reason it must be interpreted cautiously. The Newman-Keuls pro-
cedure was utilized to further analyze this result. The z-score means 
for the conformity data are found in Table XXIII. 
It is clear that if one accepts the pooling of groups and subjects 
variance, the nonaffective self-disclosure conformity mean is lower 
than any other mean and the impersqnal disclosure mean is lower than 
any other mean but nonaffective self-disclosure. In addition, the con-





Nonaffective Impersonal Disclosure Impersonal 
Treatment Self-disclosure Disclosure (Feedback) Self-disclosure Empathy 
---
.32a .42b ,63c .57c .87d 













SIGNIFICANT TWO FACTOR ANALYSES OF VARIANCE 
FOR THE PERSON PERCEPTION DATA 
Degrees 
of Mean 
Source Freedom Square Error Term 
Other Versus 1 .12 Pooled Groups 
Third Party and Subjects 
Groups 
Metaperception 1 . 85 Pooled Groups 
Vs. Perception and Subjects 
Groups 
Interaction 1 .37 Pooled Groups 
and Subjects 
Groups 
Groups 8 .78 Subjects 
Subjects 36 .17 
Other Versus 1 .08 Pooled Groups 
Third Party and Subjects 
Metaperception 1 .11 Pooled Groups 
Vs. Perception and Subjects 
Interaction 1 .65 Pooled Groups 
and Subjects 
Groups 8 .12 Subjects 
Subjects 36 .11 
Other Versus 1 .02 Pooled Groups 
Third Party and Subjects 
Groups 
Metaperception 1 . 36 Pooled Groups 
Vs. Perception and Subjects 
Groups 
























TABLE XXIV (CONTINUED) 
Degrees 
of Mean F 
Variable Source Freedom Square Error Term Ratio 
Groups 8 .42 Subjects 4. 71* 
Subjects 36 .09 
Empathy Other Versus 1 .001 Pooled Groups .01 
Third Party and Subjects 
Groups .004 
Metaperception 1 .16 Pooled Groups 2.01 
Vs. Perception and Subjects 
Groups .68 
Interaction 1 .32 Pooled Groups 4.10* 
and Subjects 
Groups 1.41 
Groups 8 .23 Subjects 5.08* 
Subjects 36 .45 
Interpersonal Other Versus 1 .02 Pooled Groups .09 
Openness Third Party and Subjects 
Groups .04 
Metaperception 1 . 36 Pooled Groups 1. 73 
Vs. Perception and Subjects 
Groups .86 
Interaction 1 .24 Pooled Groups 1.13 
and Subjects 
Groups .56 
Groups 8 .42 Subjects 8.38* 
Subjects 36 . 05 
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TABLE XXIV (CONTINUED) 
Degrees 
of Mean F 
Variable Source Freedom Square Error Term Ratio 
Naivete Other Versus 1 .005 Pooled Groups .02 
Third Party and Subjects 
Groups .01 
Metaperception 1 .04 Pooled Groups .16 
Vs. Perception and Subjects 
Groups .08 
Interaction 1 .0005 Pooled Groups .001 
and Subjects 
Groups .0005 
Groups 8 .53 Subjects 2.97* 
Subjects 36 .18 
Conformity Other Versus 1 .05 Pooled Groups .77 
Third Party and Subjects 
Groups .23 
Metaperception 1 .64 Pooled Groups 9.85* 
Vs. Perception and Subjects 
Groups 2.89 
Interaction 1 .59 Pooled Groups 9.08* 
and Subjects 
Groups 2.66 
Groups 8 .22 Subjects 7.75* 
Subjects 36 .03 
Felt Other Versus 1 .05 Pooled Groups .42 
Openness Third Party and Subjects 
Groups .12 
Metaperception 1 .03 Pooled Groups .24 
Vs. Perception and Subjects 
Groups .07 




TABLE XXIV (CONTINUED) 
Degrees 
of Mean F 
Variable Source Freedom Square Error Term Ratio 
Groups 8 . 38 Subjects 6.49* 
Subjects 36 .06 
Inspection of Table XXIV indicates that the group factor accounted 
for a significant portion of the variance in the stereotype accuracy 
data, the stereotype empathy data, the accuracy data, the empathy data, 
the interpersonal openness data, the naivete data, the conformity data, 
and the felt openness data. Some groups had significantly higher 
scores on these measures than other groups. 
Table XXIV provides evidence of a significant interaction effect 
in the stereotype empathy data. The cell means for these data are 
found in Table XXV. 
TABLE XXV 
CELL MEANS FOR STEREOTYPE EMPATHY 
Perception Metaperception 
Other Referred .97 • ~4 
Third Party Referred • 82 1.15 
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To further analyze this interaction effect the simple main effects 
of metaperception versus perception in other referred conditions and in 
the third party referred condition were computed. The F ratio for the 
metaperception versus perception effect in the other referred condition 
was 1.02, p ~ .25. The F ratio for the perceptual effect in the third 
party referred conditions was 5.04, significant beyond the .05 level. 
Thus, the metaperception condition produced higher stereotype empathy 
than the perceptual condition, but only within the third party referred 
condition. 
Another significant result in Table XXIV, if one accepts the pool-
ing of groups and subjects, is the interaction effect in the empathy 
data. This result again must be interpreted with great caution. The 
cell means for the empathy data are found in Table XXVI. 
TABLE XXVI 
CELL MEANS FOR EMPATHY DATA 
Other Referred 







To analyze this interaction effect further, the simple main effects 
of metaperception versus perception were computed. The F ratio for the 
effect of metaperception versus perception in the other referred 
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condition was .19, p 7 .25. The F ratio for the effect of metapercep-
tion versus perception in the third party referred condition was 5.92, 
significant beyond the .OS level. Thus, the metaperceptual condition 
produced higher empathy scores than the perceptual condition, but only 
within the third party referred condition. It is clear that both 
stereotype empathy and empathy show the same pattern of cell means. In 
fact we may be analyzing only one result since the correlation between 
stereotype empathy and empathy is .84 (see Table XXI). 
The final significant results in Table XXVI are found in the con-
formity data. The interaction effect and the metaperception versus 
perception main effect each reached significance if one accepts the 
pooling of the groups and subjects variance. These results should be 
considered cautiously. 
The conformity mean for the metaperceptual conditions was .72 
while the perceptual mean was .49. These means and the significant F 
ratio indicate that the subjects in the metaperceptual conditions 
scored significantly higher on the conformity measure than did the sub-
jects in the perceptual conditions. This main effect is entirely due 
to the interaction as can be seen by inspection of Table XXVII. To 
further analyze the interaction effect in the conformity data the 
simple main effects were computed. The cell means for the conformity 
data are found in Table XXVII. 
TABLE XXVII 
CELL MEANS FOR CONFORMITY DATA 
Other Referred 








The F ratio for the effect of metaperception versus perception in the 
other referred condition was .002, p > .25. The F ratio for the meta-
perception versus perception effect in the third party referred condi-
tion was 18.92 significant beyond the .05 level. Thus, in the meta-
perceptual condition subjects scored higher on the conformity measure 




The response category results make one point remarkably clear. 
The operant group method developed by Fromme has marked effects on the 
verbalizations issued in groups. It clearly has the power to elicit 
verbalizations that would not occur if subjects were in a free conver-
sation situation. Since group psychotherapy is predominantly a verbal 
phenomenon, Fromme's operant group method should be able to create a 
therapeutic verbal atmosphere. The present study clearly indicates 
that the method is able to produce significant changes in several types 
of self-disclosing verbalizations, feedback, and two types of empathy 
statements. Each of these types of statements have been thought to 
have therapeutic importance. When the verbal parameters of the group 
therapeutic situation are more clearly specified through further re-
search, Fromme's operant technique may become an important therapeutic 
modality. 
The response category data also tend to corroborate the author's 
estimation of the degree of intimacy of the response categories. The 
nonaffective self-disclosure and impersonal disclosure categories were 
used much more frequently than the other categories. These less inti-
mate categories were easier for subjects with no prior acquaintance to 
use. The more intimate categories (other disclosure Ueedback], self-




The reinforcement data provided evidence of a "boot strap" effect 
where one subject influences the group's performance. This effect has 
been found frequently in research concerning the operant group tech-
nique. It appears that the red lights tend to keep subjects within ten 
points of one another. Thus, one highly responding subject can influ-
ence the other group members to respond at a high rate. 
Another interesting result in the response category data was found 
in the analysis of the self-disclosure verbal response category. This 
analysis is unique in that a condition other than direct reinforcement 
of the response category created a high level of response. The other 
empathy category produced significantly higher levels of self-disclos-
ing responses than did the nonaffective self-disclosure and the imper-
sonal empathy condition. Recall that the other empathy condition in-
volved a fairly intimate type of verbalization where a subject was re-
quired to state what he/she thought another group member felt about an 
aspect of themselves. When a group member made such a statement, the 
person to whom the other empathy statement was referred generally dis-
closed information about him/herself that indicated that the statement 
was either correct or incorrect. An example might be employed to illus-
trate this point. One group member in the other empathy condition said 
to a second member, "I bet you're proud of your grade point." This 
occurred after the second member had disclosed nonaffective information 
concerning his grade point average for the last semester. The second 
member responded with, "I feel pretty good about it." This response 
clearly fits the self-disclosure category. Thus, it appears that the 
other empathy and the self-disclosure categories naturally exist 
together. The self-disclosure category might be thought of as a re-
sponse to the other empathy category. 
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It is interesting to note that another pair of categories appear 
to have a similar relationship. It would seem that an impersonal dis-
closure response would naturally follow an impersonal empathy response. 
No such tendency was found in the data, however. This might possible 
be due to the fact that the intimacy level of the impersonal empathy re-
sponse is much lower than the intimacy level of the other empathy re-
sponse. When a group member responds with an other empathy statement, 
the member to whom the statement is referred is immediately strongly 
involved. If the statement is inaccurate, the member to whom it is re-
ferred may feel the need to acknowledge it. Since the impersonal 
empathy statement is less intimate, the member to whom the statement is 
referred is more likely to let inaccuracies go uncorrected. Also, 
correct impersonal empathy statements aren't highly intimate and hence 
do not demand acknowledgement. 
Another finding concerning the self-disclosure response category 
data occurred in the analysis of the metaperception versus perception 
and the other referred versus third party referred factors. A signifi-
cant trend for a higher rate of self-disclosure responses in the other 
referred categories as opposed to the third party referred category is 
seen when groups and subjects variance are pooled. One must be cautious 
in interpreting this effect. However, a possible explanation of this 
effect might make use of the intimacy concept. Other group member re-
ferred statements are clearly more intimate than third party referred 
statements. Also, intimate statements surely involve a higher degree of 
interpersonal risk than less intimate statements. If one accepts the 
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idea of self-disclosure's snowballing effect being analogous to the 
risky shift phenomenon (Higbee, 1973), one can see an explanation for 
self-disclosure being more frequent in an intimate condition as opposed 
to a less intimate one. Since intimacy is a type of valued interper-
sonal risk, group members in an intimate situation should respond with 
high levels of interpersonal risk. One way to do this would be fre-
quent use of the self-disclosure category. 
Analysis of the self-disclosure questionnaire data provided find-
ings related to the discussion above. Self-disclosure again appeared 
to be at least moderately related to the intimacy dimension. The. less 
intj_mate categori.es (nonaffective self-disclosure and impersonal dis-
closure) produced lower self-disclosure scores than did the more inti-
mate categories (other disclosure [feedback], self-disclosure, imper-
sonal empathy, and other empathy). Again, we see that self-disclosure 
is related to the intimacy of the interaction. This finding does not 
appear to be extremely potent since there was no significant treatment 
effect and only one overall planned comparison was significant. It is 
possible that the self-disclosure questionnaire is not actually as in-
timate a type of self-disclosure as is a self-disclosure response. If 
one looks at the items in the self-disclosure questionnaire it is clea,r 
that they are comprised of historical data and other types of informa-
tion concerning the self. If this information were verbalized the 
statement would fit the nonaffecti.ve self-disclosure category predom-
inantly. Thus, the Jourard measure of self-disclosure is not as inti-
mate as are self-disclosure responses. It may be, for this reason, 
that stronger effects on self-disclosure questionnaire data were not 
observed. 
This idea is further corroborated by the findings concerning the 
metaperception versus perception and the other referred versus third 
party referred factors in the self-disclosure questionnaire data. No 
significant third party versus other effect was found. Since this 
factor is strongly related to intimacy, as is discussed above, and 
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since the self-disclosure questionnaire does not concern extremely inti-
mate content, no effect would be expected. However, tendency toward a 
higher self-disclosure score in the metaperceptual conditions as com-
pared to the direct perceptual conditions was observed. It is possible 
that when self-disclosure involves informational content, as the self-
disclosure questionnaire does, the probability of being understood may 
influence disclosure. It is probable that one would feel more likely 
to be understood in the metaperceptual conditions than in the direct 
perceptual conditions. This is the case since in the metaperceptual 
conditions empathic statements are more frequent. Thus, the tendency 
to disclose information would be expected to be high since the empathic 
statements of others would make it seem highly probable that one would 
be heard and understood. 
Analysis of the Elm's Empathy Scale provided no significant re-
sults. It is possible that this measure was not tapping the appropriate 
kind of empathy. The Elm's measures, on the face of it, the ability to 
mentally put one's self in another's place. In the present study, em-
pathy involved the actual verbalization of an empathic thought. This, 
of course, is much more difficult to do than merely thinking how 
another must feel. Thus, the empathy scale is not strongly related to 
the empathy treatments in the present study. 
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The cohesiveness measures (the attractiveness item and the tendency 
to cohere item) provided only one significant result. The aspect of 
cohesiveness measured by the attractiveness item was slightly greater 
in the impersonal empathy condition than in the nonaffective self-
disclosure and the impersonal disclosure condtions. Thus, impersonal 
empathy statements may foster group cohesiveness more than less inti-
mate statements. 
Only one result was obtained in the enjoyment and meaningfulness 
item data. The other empathy condition was rated as more meaningful 
than the nonaffective self-disclosure condition coupled with the imper-
sonal disclosure condition. Although none of the other dependent 
variables were affected in this way, subjects still felt the category 
was meaningful. The intimacy of the condition may produce this high 
evaluation by subjects. 
Significant effects were also found in the person perception data. 
First, the impersonal empathy subjects' conformity scores, a measure 
of the degree to which one's judgement of others conforms to the 
group's judgements of others, were significantly higher than the scores 
of other subjects' scores. This result was only seen when groups and 
subjects variability was pooled, however. For this reason, the result 
must be regarded as tentative. The finding, however, would seem quite 
logical since the impersonal empathy condition reinforced empathic 
statements. Specifically, this condition had a high level of state-
ments where subjects verbalized what they thought other group members 
felt about third parties. This is essentially attempting to know how 
another group member feels. To the extent that group members are able 
to know how other group members feel, is exactly the extent to which 
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they are able to conform. This analysis raises one question, however. 
Why didn't the subjects in the other empathy condition conform? The 
answer may lie in the very small number of other empathy statements 
that were actually issued in the other empathy condition. Since few 
statements were issued, subjects were not able to actually know how 
other group members felt. Possibly, for this reason they were unable 
to conform. Another possibility is the intimacy of the other empathy 
condition. The intimacy of this condition may have resulted in a high 
level of emotional arousal. Extreme arousal has often been shown to 
decrease performance. In this case, emotional arousal may have re-
sulted in poor formation of clear person percepts. Since subjects' 
percepts were not clear, there was no way to conform to those percepts. 
The conformity scores were significantly lower in the nonaffective 
self-disclosure condition than in any other condition. This seems 
logical since subjects in this condition verbalized many nonaffective, 
somewhat trivial pieces of information. Thus, subjects were unable to 
conform since they knew little about each others' feelings. 
The subjects in the impersonal disclosure condition scored signif-
icantly lower than any other condition except the nonaffective self-
disclosure condition. Subjects in this condition were able to learn 
more about each others' feelings and hence were able to conform to a 
higher level than nonaffective self-disclosure subjects. However, they 
were able to learn only slightly more and they remained significantly 
lower than the more intimate conditions. 
The conformity data analysis also found metaperceptual conditions 
to create more conformity than the direct perceptual conditions. 
Again, this is quite logical since metaperception is the perception of 
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the perceptions of others. If one can know the perceptions of another 
then he/she is able to conform to those perceptions. Direct perception 
does not focus on the perceptions of others and hence cannot foster 
conformity to those perceptions. 
Two other person perception variables, stereotype empathy and 
empathy, also yielded significant results. Stereotype empathy, how 
accurately subjects predict how the "average other" sees him/herself, 
is strongly correlated (.84) with empathy, how accurately a subject 
predicted how others see themselves. For this reason, they will be con-
sidered together. Both variables yielded a similar pattern of results. 
In each, metaperception created higher scores than perception, but only 
when the referent was a third party. (This pattern also occurred in 
the conformity data. This, however, was not due solely to a correla-
tion with the empathy and stereotype empathy measures since these corre-
lations were not excessive, .55 and .42 respectively). 
The patterns of empathy and stereotype empathy may be explained in 
a fashion similar to the one forwarded for conformity. Both the imper-
sonal empathy condition and the other empathy condition essentially in-
volved practice in knowing the feelings of others. The other disclo-
sure (feedback), and impersonal disclosure conditions did not. If just 
this were considered one would expect the impersonal empathy and other 
empathy subjects to have higher empathy scores than the other disclo-
sure (feedback) and the impersonal disclosure subjects. However, the 
other empathy condition was quite intimate and may have resulted in 
highly aroused emotions which may have decreased the formation of clear 
percepts. Also, the other empathy category was not used at a high rate 
and for this reason there was less practice in knowing the feelings of 
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others. Thus, only the impersonal empathy condition showed high levels 
of empathy and stereotype empathy. 
It is well now to reflect on the possible mistakes made in the 
present study in order that future research may not make them again. 
Several problems may have limited the number of significant results. 
The first problem with the present study is large group effects in the 
data other than reinforceable responses. (Reinforceable response group 
effects are a result of the conditioning technique as is discussed 
above). Group effects, in part, comprise the error term for the more 
interesting experimental effects. For this reason, large group effects 
obscure experimental effects. In further research dealing with the 
operant group method, this problem might be dealt with in two ways. 
The first and perhaps the best way to deal with this problem is to form 
groups in such a way as to make them equivalent in terms of several 
personality variables. Perhaps forming groups on the basis of scores 
on such instruments as the MMPI, the 16-PF, or some other personality 
test might minimize group variance. Another similar method to reduce 
group variance would be to form groups on the basis of FIRO-B compati-
bility. This was actually done by Fromme and Close (1976). The second 
way to deal with the group variance might be to use group scores as a 
covariate. 
A second problem with the present study was the subject population 
used. The experimental procedure required subjects to respond verbally 
in intimate and seemingly meaningful ways. This, of course, requires a 
high level of commitment on the part of the subjects. The author 
strongly doubts that the minimal class credit received for participation 
in this study provided sufficient incentive for subjects to make such a 
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commitment. This is especially true when receiving class credit was 
contingent on attendance, not on meaningful participation. At any rate, 
a more appropriate subject population might be chosen. Perhaps members 
of therapy or growth groups might possibly be enlisted as subjects. 
They would surely have a higher commitment because it is likely that 
they would receive personal gain for meaningful participation. This 
is certainly a more appropriate incentive in a group therapy analogue 
than is minimal class credit. 
Thirdly, the present study may have failed to obtain more results 
because of the measures Used. Aside from the Elm's Empathy Scale and 
the Jourard Self-disclosure Questionnaire, each of the measures used 
was unvalidated and of unproven reliability. Most had never been used 
before. This, of course, is not to say that the measures used are not 
good ones. It only means that the author was not certain from the out-
set that they were adequate. This certainly would place the present 
study in the high risk category. It would be well to obtain validity 
and reliability data on these measures before they are utilized in 
further studies. 
The fourth and perhaps most important mistake made in the present 
study is the use of only one group session. That tentative results 
were obtained with only one session points to the strength of the 
operant group method. It is probable that more striking, less tenta-
tive results would be obtained by use of several group sessions. This 
author would recommend strongly that future research in the area use 
as many sessions as pragmatic concerns will allow. 
In sum, the operant group method was shown to be effective in 
altering the verbal behavior of group members. High levels of the 
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reinforced verbal response categories were created when compared with 
free conversation. A behavioral measure of self-disclosure found other 
referred conditions to be superior to third party referred conditions 
in fostering self-disclosure. A pencil and paper questionnaire measure 
of self-disclosure found highly intimate conditions to produce higher 
levels of self-disclosure than less intimate conditions. Also, this 
measure found that metaperceptual conditions fostered self-disclosure 
more than perceptual conditions. Cohesiveness, as measured by an 
attractiveness item, was higher in the impersonal empathy condition than 
in less intimate conditions. Subjects saw the other empathy condition 
as more meaningful than the less intimate conditions. Finally, a 
pencil and paper questionnaire found conformity, empathy, and stereo-
type empathy to be higher in the externally referred empathy (or meta-
perceptual) condition than in the external self-disclosure (or percep-
tual) condition. 
Finally, the results tend to indicate in general that impersonal 
empathy statements are superior to other statements in the operant 
group setting. It may be, however, that use of a number of group 
sessions would result in different findings. In the author's view, 
other empathy might provide even stronger effects than impersonal em-
pathy if the intial emotional arousal of subjects was reduced. This 
might occur over time through familiarity with group members and the 
response category. Reduced arousal might possibly allow for very 
clear formation of person percepts since it would be coupled with high 
intimacy. It is not only the author's opinion that other empathy may 
have meaningful effects. Subjects also tended to rate this condition 
as more meaningful than less intimate conditions. At any rate, it is 
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the author's firm subjective impression that the other empathy condi-
tion produced a meaningful and an intimate type of interaction. One 
theoretical position that might be of relevance to the present discus-
sion was presented by Cozby (1973). Cozby suggested that self-disclo-
sure was related to mental health in a curvilinear fashion. Specific-
ally, both extremely high and extremely low disclosers were likely to 
exhibit low mental health \vhile moderate disclosers were likely to ex-
hibit high mental health. If mental health and the intimacy of inter-
actions are related in the same way, a possible explanation for the 
lack of results in the other empathy condition comes to light. The 
other empathy condition is possibly too intimate for an initial group 
session. Other empathy would then be related to reduced mental health 
rather than greater mental health. This would be true only for initial 
sessions, however. As more intimate material became more acceptable to 
group members in later sessions, other empathy might possibly be more 
appropriate and thus be related to improved mental health. 
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APPENDIX A 
Outline of Measures of Person 
Perceptions in Groups 
1. Congruence (CG): degree to which one rates others as they are 
perceived rating oneself (perceived behavior exchange). 
2. Accuracy (A): degree to which a person can predict how others 
perceive him (self accuracy). 
3. Empathy (E): degree to which a person can predict how others see 
themselves (other accuracy). 
4. Interpersonal Openness (IO): degree to which others can predict 
your rating of them (reflects degree to which one is understood). 
5. Personal Openness (PO): degree to which others can predict one's 
self concept (reflects degree to which one is understood). 
6. Felt Openness (FO): degree to which one predicts that others 
agree with one's self perception (reflects degree to which one 
feels understood). 
7. Perceived Similarity (PS): degree to which one rates oneself 
similar to others. 
8. Naivete (N): degree to which one rates others as they are per-
ceived rating themselves (reflects acceptance of others self 
presentations). 
9. Conformity (CF): degree to which ones' judgement of others con-
forms to the group's judgements (encompasses empathy; low CF 
requires other accuracy, plus conformity). 
10. Other Variance (OV): the variance in a person's other ratings. 
11. Self as Other Variance (SOV): the variance in a person's self as 
other ratings. 
12. Other's Self Variance (OSV): the variance in a person's other's 
self ratings. 
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13. Stereotype Accuracy (SA): degree to which a person can predict 
how "average other" perceives him/her. 
14. Stereotype Empathy (SE): how accurately subjects predict how 




Verbal Instructions Given Prior to Free Conversation 
This experiment is designed to study the way people get to know 
each other. In previous experiemnts we've found that the types of 
statements people use to get to know one another can greatly effect 
the way they feel about one another. This experiment will study sev-
eral important types of statements. 
Before I explain about the equipment on the table and the type of 
statement I'd like you to use, I want you to spend ten minutes talking 
in the same way you would if this group were to meet outside this ex-
periment. I need to find out how your normal way of getting to know 
one another differs from the way you will use later in the experiment. 
I'll be monitoring your conversation through the microphone from behind 
the one-way mirror. I want you to get to know each other as you would 
normally. Are there any questions? (Experimenter answers any questions 
briefly). O.K., for the next ten minutes try to get to know each other 
in the way you would if you had met outside the experiment. 
Verbal Instructions Given After the Free Conversation 
These cards (experimenter gives verbal response category cards to 
each subject) are specific statements of just one of the types of ex-
pressions that people can use to get to know each other. Read your 
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card silently while I read it aloud (experimenter reads appropriate 
card). Now I would like to give you some examples of this category so 
that you can understand exactly what the category is like (experimenter 
reads and discusses appropriate examples). 
Nonaffective Self-disclosure Condition 
1. I am from Enid. 
2. I played basketball in high school. 
3. I went skiing over Christmas break. 
4. My grade point was 3.00 last semester. 
This type of statement can be helpful in getting to know one 
another in intimate and important ways. When you express information 
about yourself people are better able to relate to you since they really 
know who you are. You should avoid expressing feelings about this in-
formation, however. When a person expresses poisitive feelings about 
him/herself, he/she is bragging. When someone expresses negative feel-
ings about him/herself, he/she is putting him/herself down. When you 
express information about yourself in a noncommittal fashion people tend 
to like you better because you trust them enough to let them make their 
own decisions about you. Because of this, expressing information about 
yourself without expressing feelings can be the basis of a trusting 
relationship. 
Impersonal Disclosure Condition 
1. I feel happy about being here with you. 
2. I enjoyed my instructor's comments. 
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3. I hate spinach. 
4. Math isn't my favorite subject. 
This type of statement can be very useful in getting to know one 
another in intimate and important ways. When you tell people how you 
feel about things you are showing that you trust them with these im-
portant feelings. This can be the start of a trsuting relationship. 
Also, this kind of disclosure helps people know who you are, what you 
like, and what you dislike. When others know these things about you, 
they are better able to relate to you. They can better appreciate 
your positive feelings. They can also help you with negative feelings. 
Finally, expressing feelings can help you to learn more about these 
feelings. By verbalizing them you may heighten your awareness of them. 
Self-disclosure Condition 
1. I like my ability to relate well with others. 
2. I'm confident with my academic ability. 
3. I wish I were better looking. 
4. I hate the fact that I lied to my friend. 
This type of statement can be very useful in getting to know one 
another in intimate and important ways. When you tell people how you 
feel about yourself, you are showing that you trust them with these im-
portant feelings. This can be the start of a trusting relationship. 
Also, this kind of disclosure helps people know who you are, what you 
like about yourself, and what you dislike about yourself. When others 
know these things about you, they are better able to relate to you. 
They can better appreciate your positive aspects and your positive 
feelings about yourself. They can also help you with the negative 
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aspects of yourself and your feelings about them. Finally, expressing 
feelings about yourself can help you to learn more about yourself. By 
verbalizing these feelings, you may heighten your awareness of these 
feelings. 
Other Disclosure (Feedback) Condition 
1. I like you. 
2. You look very nice today. 
3. You aren't a very friendly person. 
4. I think you're a loud mouth. 
This type of statement can be very useful in getting to know one 
another in intimate and important ways. When you tell other people how 
you feel about them, you are clearly communicating important information 
about your relationship with them. If something about another is annoy-
ing to you, it is important to communicate this to that person. Unless 
the person knows you're annoyed about something, he can do nothing 
about it. On the other hand, if another person is doing something very 
pleasing to you, it is also important for him/her to know. By communi-
cating your positive feelings to the other person, you have rewarded the 
person and made him/her feel good. In this way it becomes extremely 
likely that the person will continue to behave in the same pleasing 
way. Finally, expressing your feelings about a person directly to that 
person shows that you are able to openly communicate about your rela-
tionship with him/her. This type of verbalization fosters an open 
relationship where things are not hidden but are brought out in the open 
and worked through. 
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Impersonal Empathy Condition 
1. I think you like most people. 
2. I think you dislike your home town. 
3. I think you're happy to be part of the group. 
4. You look nervous. 
This type of statement can be very helpful in getting to know one 
another in intimate and important ways. Using this type of verbaliza-
tion is an attempt to know how a person feels, to really try to get 
into his/her shoes for a time. The effort to understand another 
person's feelings is perhaps the most important thing we have to give 
another person. This type of statement shows the other person that you 
care for him/her. The person who uses this kind of statement is cer-
tain to be a nice person to be around since it is extremely unlikely 
that such a person would hurt another. He/she is unlikely to hurt 
someone intentionally since he/she is a caring person. Also, he/she is 
unlikely to hurt someone unintentionally since he/she is a person who 
tries to understand the feelings of others. Finally, the use of this 
type of statement is likely to cause others to use them also. When a 
person shows he cares about the feelings of another person, the other 
is more likely to care about his/her feelings. 
Other Empathy Condition 
1. I think you really like yourself. 
2. I think you're getting down on yourself. 
3. You must feel very good about your ability to make people 
like you. 
4. I think you have confidence in yourself. 
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This type of statement can be very helpful in getting to know one 
another in intimate and important ways. Using this type of verbaliza-
tion is an attempt to know how a person feels about himself, to really 
try to get into his/her shoes for a time. The effort to understand 
another person's feelings is perhaps the most important thing we have 
to give another person. This type of statement shows the other person 
that you care for him/her. The person who uses this kind of statement 
is certain to be a nice person to be around since it is extremely un-
likely that such a person would hurt another. He/she is unlikely to 
hurt someone intentionally since he/she is a caring person. Also, 
he/she is unlikely to hurt someone unintentionally since he/she is a 
person who tries to understand the feelings of others. Finally, the 
use of this type of statement is likely to cause others to use them 
also. When a person shows he cares about the feelings of another per-
son, the other is more likely to care about his/her feelings. 
I know that using statements in this category may be difficult for 
some of you but your efforts in using the category can have beneficial 
results. You may come to know the members of this group better and you 
may also increase your own social skills. Because of these possible 
benefits, your attempts to use this category sincerely can really pay 
off. To make sure that each of you understands the type of statement 
that I'm talking about I want to go through a short exercise. First, 
I want you to gaze into the eyes of the person next to you. I know 
that this is not the normal way of getting acquainted but we've found 
it is a very good way to start these groups. The two people on the 
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right side of the table should turn your chairs toward one another and 
gaze into one anothers' eyes (experimenter waits until subjects comply). 
The two people on the left side of the table should also turn your 
chairs toward each other and gaze into one anothers' eyes (experimenter 
waits until subjects comply). Focus on the feelings that you and your 
partner are having as you go through this exercise. (For experimental 
groups only) think about how you can verbalize these feelings by use of 
one of the types of statements we've talked about. (Exercise continues 
for ten seconds. After this time with subjects still gazing into one 
anothers' eyes each person is asked to verbalize an appropriate state-
ment. If any subject is unable to make an appropriate statement the 
experimenter prompts the subject until he/she is able to do so. If 
prompting does not elicit a response, an appropriate statement is 
supplied by the experimenter). 
For the purpose of this experiment it would be helpful if you could 
each use as many statements of the type we've just talked about as you 
can in your conversation in the next fifty minutes. I realize that it 
is impossible to have every statement you make fit the category and 
still maintain a good conversation. I don't expect you to use the 
category all the time. Also, don't say something just to fit the cate-
gory if you don't mean it. Try very hard to use the category in a 
sincere way. The beneficial effects of the use of this category can 
only be obtained if you use the category honestly and sincerely. 
Whenever someone makes a statement fitting this category, I will 
activate the counter in front of that person. It makes a click which 
will let you know that you are in fact using an appropriate kind of 
statement in your interaction. The counter registers your total and if 
125 
anyone falls ten points behind the person with the most counts, the red 
li.ght on his/her counter will be turned on. This will be a sign that 
either this person may need assistance in using the appropriate state-
ments, or that someone is dominating the conversation. If no one gets 
a click for three minutes, all the lights will flash on; and they will 
do so every three-minute period until a click is registered. This will 
be a sign tha.t the group as a \-Thole is not using appropriate statements 
a.nd that you should change the nature of your interaction. 
I realize that the apparatus makes for an artificial situation, 
but it's the least distracting non-disruptive way we have found to give 
you tnformation concerning your j_nteractions while those interactions 
are taking place. 
Finally, I want to tell you that I will again be monitoring the 
group through the one-way mirror and the microphone. What you say will 
be used only for the purpose of this study and will be kept strictly 
confidential. 
APPENDIX C 
COHESIVENESS, ENJOYMENT AND MEANINGFULNESS ITEMS 
On the four seven point scales found below you should rate the way 
you see the grou~ Give the group a rating of 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, or 6 by 
making an "X" in the appropriate blank. To help you make your decision 
about the rating, 0 and 6 have been defined below. 
6 5 4 
6 means, "The people in this 
group are extremely attractive 
to me." 
6 5 4 
6 means, "I would very much 
like to continue contact with 
this group of people when the 
experiment is over." 
6 __ s __ 4 __ 
6 means, "The group inter-
action has been meaningful 
to me personally." 
6 5 4 --- --- ---
6 means, "This group experi-




3 __ _ 
3 ---
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2 1 0 
0 means, "The people in this 
group are not very attractive 
to me. II 
2 1 0 
0 means, "I wouldn't care to 
continue contact with these 
people when the experiment is 
over." 
2. __ _ 1. __ _ o __ _ 
0 means, "The group inter-
action has not been meaning-
ful to me personally." 
2 --- 1 --- o __ _ 
0 means, "This group experi-




Rate each statement. A rating of 0 means "I would tell this 
group nothing about this aspect of me or I would lie to them." One 
means "I would talk in general terms about this aspect." Two means "I 
would talk in full and complete detail about this aspect." 
1. What I think and feel about religion; my personal religious 
views. 
2. My views on the present government--the president, government, 
policies, etc. 
3. My personal views on sexual morality - how I feel that I and 
others ought to behave in sexual matters. 
4. The things that I regard as desirable for a man to be - what 
I look for in a man. 
5. My favorite reading matter. 
6. The style of house, and the kinds of furnishings that I like 
best. 
7. The kind of party, or social gathering that I like best, and 
the kind that would bore me, or that I wouldn't enjoy. 
8. My favorite ways of spending spare time, e.g., hunting, 
reading, cards, sports events, parties, dancing, etc. 
9. What I would appreciate most for a present. 
10. What I find to be the worst pressures and strains in my work. 
11. What I feel are my shortcomings and handicaps that prevent me 
from getting further ahead in my work. 
12. What I feel are my special strong points and qualifications 
for my work. 
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13. My ambitions and goals in my work. 
14. How I feel about the choice of career that I have made -
whether or not I'm satisfied with it. 
15. Whether or not I owe money; if so, how much. 
16. The aspects of my personality that I dislike, worry about, 
that I regard as a handicap to me. 
17. What feelings, if any, that I have trouble expressing or 
controlling. 
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18. The facts of my present sex life - including knowledge of how 
I get sexual gratification; any problems that I might have; with whom 
I have relations, if anybody. 
19. Whether or not I feel that I am attractive to the opposite 
sex; my problems, if any, about getting favorable attention from the 
opposite sex. 
20. Things in the past or present that I feel ashamed and guilty 
about. 
21. The kinds of things that make me just furious. 
22. What it takes to get me feeling real depressed or blue. 
23. What it takes to get me real worried, anxious, and afraid. 
24. What it takes to hurt my feelings deeply. 
25. The kinds of things that make me especially proud of myself, 
elated, full of self-esteem or self-respect. 
26. My feelings about the appearance of my face - things I don't 
like, and things that I might like about my face and head - eyes, nose, 
hair, teeth, etc. 
27. How I wish I looked: my ideals for overall appearance. 
28. Whether or not I now have any health problems- e.g., trouble 
with sleep, digestion, female complaints, heart condition, allergies, 
headaches, piles, etc. 
29. Whether or not I have any long-range worries or concerns 
about my health, e.g., cancer, ulcers, heart trouble. 
30. My feelings about my adequacy in sexual behavior - whether or 
not I feel able to perform adequately in sex relationships. 
APPENDIX E 
ELM'S EMPATHIC FANTASY SCALE 
1. When I read an interesting story or novel, I imagine how I would 
feel if the events in the story were happening to me. 
(circle one number) 
extremely moderately neutral moderately extremely 
true t:i:ue false false 
1 2 3 4 5 
2. When I see strangers, I almost never try to imagine what they are 
thinking. 
1 2 3 4 5 
3. I like to imagine myself as being various different types of 
persons. 
1 2 3 4 5 
4. I usually feel that I know exactly what mood my friends are in, 
even when nothing is said in words. 
1 2 3 4 5 
5. I find it hard to imagine how a poor southern negro feels about 
white people. 
1 2 3 4 5 
6. It's hard for me to act as if I'm a different kind of person than 
I really am. 
1 2 4 5 
7. After acting in a play myself, or seeing a play or movie, I have 
felt partly as though I were one of the characters. 
1 2 3 4 5 
8. When I disagree with a person, I do not try to feel in my own mind 
the reason why the person holds an opinion different from mine. 
1 2 3 4 5 
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9. I often try to guess what people are thinking, before they tell 
me. 
1 2 3 4 5 
10. A person can't really know what is going on inside someone else's 
head. 
1 2 3 4 5 
APPENDIX F 
GROUP PERCEPTIONS TEST 
On each of a number of areas, you are to make ratings describing: 
1. how you see yourself; 2. how you see each of the other group mem-
hers; 3. your prediction or guess about how each group member sees 
you; 4. your prediction or guess about how each group member sees him/ 
herself. These last two tasks, predicting the others' ratings, can be 
rather difficult. They require you to put yourself in the other group 
members' shoes and imagine how you appear to them and how they see 
themselves. Please take your time and try your very best. This infor-
mation can lead to a better understanding of how people come to know 
one another. 
Your task is to rate the degree to which one of two adjectives, 
opposite in meaning, is descriptive of the person or viewpoint being 












You might see yourself as very kind and so should mark the "A" column on 
the IBM card. You might see the person sitting in Chair 2 as moderately 
cruel and mark the "D" column for the appropriate item. If you predict 
that the person in Chair 3 sees you neutral on this scale, mark the 
appropriate "C". All marks must be made with number 2 pencils and 
should be a single, dark line through the center of the "circle". 
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You have been provided with a card, listing each group members' 
name and the number of the chair in which he/she was sitting. Please 
refer to this card so that you will know to whom each item refers. The 
items below describe the person for whom ratings or predictions are 
made only by the Chair Number. Items which refer to your own chair 
number have been marked out and should be skipped. 
Please keep your answers confidential and discuss the test only 
with the experimenter. Please do not mark on this booklet. Do you 








1. How strong/weak do you see yourself? 
Moderately 
D 
2. How strong/weak do you see the person in Chair 1? 
3. How strong/weak do you see the person in Chair 2? 
4. How strong/weak do you see the person in Chair 3? 
5. How strong/weak do you see the person in Chair 4? 
6. How strong/weak does the person in Chair 1 see you? 
7. How strong/weak does the person in Chair 2 see you? 
8. How strong/weak does the person in Chair 3 see you? 
9. How strong/weak does the person in Chair 4 see you? 
Very 
E 
10. How strong/weak does the person in Chair 1 see him/herself? 
11. How strong/weak does the person in Chair 2 see him/herself? 
12. How strong/weak does the person in Chair 3 see him/herself? 











14. How friendly/hostile do you see yourself? 
Very 
E 
15. How friendly/hostile do you see the person in Chair 1? 
16. How friendly/hostile do you see the person in Chair 2? 
17. How friendly/hostile do you see the person in Chair 3? 
18. How friendly/hostile do you see the person in Chair 4? 
19. How friendly/hostile does the person in Chair 1 see you? 
20. How friendly/hostile does the person in Chair 2 see you? 
21. How friendly/hostile does the person in Chair 3 see you? 
22. How friendly/hostile does the person in Chair 4 see you? 
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:HOSTILE 
23. How friendly/hostile does the person in Chair 1 see him/herself? 
24. How friendly/hostile does the person in Chair 2 see him/herself? 
25. How friendly/hostile does the person in Chair 3 see him/herself? 










27. How passive/active do you see yourself? 
Very 
E 
28. How passive/active do you see the person in Chair 1? 
29. How passive/active do you see the person in Chair 2? 
30. How passive/active do you see the person in Chair 3? 
31. How passive/active do you see the person in Chair 4? 
32. How passive/active does the person in Chair 1 see you? 
33. How passive/active does the person in Chair 2 see you? 
34. How passive/active does the person in Chair 3 see you? 
35. How passive/active does the person in Chair 4 see you? 
:ACTIVE 
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36. How passive/active does the person in Chair 1 see him/herself? 
37. How passive/active does the person in Chair 2 see him/herself? 
38. How passive/active does the person in Chair 3 see him/herself? 
39. How passive/acitve does the person in Chair 4 see him/herself? 
Very Moderately Neutral Moderately Very 
GOOD: A B c D E :BAD 
40. How good/bad do you see yourself? 
41. How good/bad do you see the person in Chair 1? 
42. How good/bad do you see the person in Chair 2? 
43. How good/bad do you see the person in Chair 3? 
44. How good/bad do you see the person in Chair 4? 
45. How good/bad does the person in Chair 1 see you? 
46. How good/bad does the person in Chair 2 see you? 
47. How good/bad does the person in Chair 3 see you? 
48. How good/bad does the person in Chair 4 see you? 
49. How good/bad does the person in Chair 1 see him/herself? 
50. How good/bad does the person in Chair 2 see him/herself? 
51. How good/bad does the person in Chair 3 see him/herself? 
52. How good/bad does the person in Chair 4 see him/herself? 
Very Moderately Neutral Moderately Very 
DOMINANT: A B c D E :SUBMISSIVE 
53. How dominant/submissive do yo4 see yourself? 
54. How dominant/submissive do you see the person in Chair 1? 
55. How dominant/submissive do you see tqe person in Chair 2? 
56. How dominant/submissive do you see the person in Chair 3? 
57. How dominant/submissive do you see the person in Chair 4? 
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58. How dominant/submissive does the person in Chair 1 see you? 
59. How dominant/submissive does the person in Chair 2 see you? 
60. How dominant/submissive does the person in Chair 3 see you? 
61. How dominant/submissive does the person in Chair 4 see you? 
62. How dominant/submissive does the person in Chair 1 see him/herself? 
63 How dominant/submissive does the person in Chair 2 see him/herself? 
64. How dominant/submissive does the person in Chair 3 see him/herself? 








66. How cold/warm do you see yourself? 
Moderately 
D 
67. How cold/warm do you see the person in Chair 1? 
68. How cold/warm do you see the person in Chair 2? 
69. How cold/warm do you see the person in Chair 3? 
70. How cold/warm do you see the person in Chair 4? 
71. How cold/warm does the person in Chair 1 see you? 
72. How cold/warm does the person in Chair 2 see you? 
73. How cold/warm does the person in Chair 3 see you? 
74. How cold/warm does the person in Chair 4 see you? 
Very 
E 
75. How cold/warm does the person in Chair 1 see him/herself? 
76. How cold/warm does the person in Chair 2 see him/herself? 
77. How cold/warm does the person in Chair 3 see him/herself? 









D E :CAUTIOUS 
79. How impulsive/cautious do you see yourself? 
80. How impulsive/cautious do you see the person in Chair 1? 
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81. How impulsive/cautious do you see the person in Chair 2? 
82. How impulsive/cautious do you see the person in Chair 3? 
83. How impulsive/cautious do you see the person in Chair 4? 
84. How impulsive/cautious does the person in Chair 1 see you? 
85. How impulsive/cautious does the person in Chair 2 see you? 
86. How impulsive/cautious does the person in Chair 3 see you? 
87. How impulsive/cautious does the person in Chair 4 see you? 
88. How impulsive/cautious does the person in Chair 1 see him/herself? 
89. How impulsive/cautious does the person in Chair 2 see him/herself? 
90. How impulsive/cautious does the person in Chair 3 see him/herself? 










92. How dull/intelligent do you see yourself? 
Very 
E :INTELLIGENT 
93. How dull/intelligent do you see the person in Chair 1? 
94. How dull/intelligent do you see the person in Chair 2? 
95. How dull/intelligent do you see the person in Chair 3? 
96. How dull/intelligent do you see the person in Chair 4? 
97. How dull/intelligent does the person in Chair 1 see you? 
98. How dull/intelligent does the person in Chair·2 see you? 
99. How dull/intelligent does the person in Chair 3 see you? 
100. How dull/intelligent does the person in Chair 4 see you? 
101. How dull/intelligent does the person in Chair 1 see him/herself? 
102. How dull/intelligent does the person in Chair 2 see him/herself? 
103. How dull/intelligent does the person in Chair 3 see him/herself? 
104. How dull/intelligent does the person in Chair 4 see him/herself? 
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Very Moderately Neutral Moderately Very 
HOMELY: A B c D E :ATTRACTIVE 
105. How homely/attractive do you see yourself? 
106. How homely/attractive do you see the person in Chair 1? 
107. How homely/attractive do you see the person in Chair 2? 
108. How homely/attractive do you see the person in Chair 3? 
109. How homely/attractive do you see the person in Chair 4? 
110. How homely/attractive does the person in Chair 1 see you? 
111. How homely/attractive does the person in Chair 2 see you? 
112. How homely/attractive does the person in Chair 3 see you? 
113. How homely/attractive does the person in Chair 4 see you? 
114. How homely/attractive does the person in Chair 1 see him/herself? 
115. How homely/attractive does the person in Chair 2 see him/herself? 
116. How homely/attractive does the person in Chair 3 see him/herself? 
117. How homely/attractive does the person in Chair 4 see him/herself? 
Very Moderately Neutral Moderately Very 
OPEN: A B c D E :CLOSED 
118. How open/closed do you see yourself? 
119. How open/closed do you see the person in Chair 1? 
120. How open/closed do you see the person in Chair 2? 
121. How open/closed do you see the person in Chair 3? 
122. How open/closed do you see the person in Chair 4? 
123. How open/closed does the person in Chair 1 see you? 
124. How open/closed does the person in Chair 2 see you? 
125. How open/closed does the person in Chair 3 see you? 
126. How open/closed does the person in Chair 4 see you? 
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127. How open/closed does the person in Chair 1 see him/herself? 
128. How open/closed does the person in Chair 2 see him/herself? 
129. How open/closed does the person in Chair 3 see him/herself? 








First Second Third Fourth Fifth 
Free Ten Ten Ten Ten Ten 
Condition Group Subject Conversation Minutes Minutes Minutes Minutes Minutes 
Nonaffective 1 1 16 13 14 11 13 16 
Self- 1 2 9 7 12 17 16 17 
disclosure 1 3 10 9 9 22 14 13 
1 4 16 9 16 20 9 17 
2 1 8 8 10 15 15 10 
2 2 8 13 18 20 14 14 
2 3 12 7 20 15 16 7 
2 4 13 16 15 21 17 12 
3 1 13 13 19 23 17 11 
3 2 7 20 20 18 18 15 
3 3 10 13 21 16 21 16 
3 4 27 15 19 17 19 19 
TABLE XXVIII (CONTINUED) 
First Second Third Fourth Fifth 
Free Ten Ten Ten Ten Ten 
Condition Group Subject Conversation Minutes Minutes Minutes Minutes Minutes 
Impersonal 1 1 3 11 9 13 13 12 
Disclosure 1 2 6 8 11 10 13 6 
1 3 1 8 3 11 16 9 
1 4 8 11 1 14 12 9 
2 1 0 11 11 11 21 21 
2 2 3 9 14 17 13 20 
2 3 14 19 11 10 21 20 
2 4 8 15 9 16 16 25 
3 1 2 10 10 11 11 5 
3 2 7 14 13 7 11 11 
3 3 0 9 9 2 6 2 
3 4 3 17 12 14 9 8 
Other 1 1 0 3 6 4 13 3 
Disclosure 1 2 0 2 5 2 6 8 
(Feedback) 1 3 0 2 4 3 6 6 
1 4 0 4 0 1 7 9 
2 1 0 5 2 6 7 10 
2 2 0 6 3 6 7 8 
2 3 0 2 1 2 3 3 
2 4 0 2 1 3 3 5 
3 1 1 4 2 6 4 3 
3 2 0 1 1 4 2 5 
3 3 0 1 1 1 2 3 




TABLE XXVIII (CONTINUED) 
First Second Third Fourth Fifth 
Free Ten Ten Ten Ten Ten 
Condition Group Subject Conversation Minutes Minutes Minutes Minutes Minutes 
Self- 1 1 0 3 3 3 5 5 
disclosure 1 2 1 1 3 4 8 11 
1 3 1 1 1 3 5 5 
1 4 0 1 1 1 3 6 
2 1 1 5 0 2 2 0 
2 2 0 12 2 1 3 2 
2 3 0 2 3 1 1 1 
2 4 0 3 1 2 1 0 
3 1 0 2 3 3 1 2 
3 2 0 4 4 3 0 2 
3 3 0 2 3 2 2 3 
3 4 3 8 6 2 2 2 
Impersonal 1 1 0 3 1 1 2 1 
Empathy 1 2 0 1 1 0 1 0 
1 3 0 2 1 2 1 1 
1 4 0 2 2 2 1 3 
2 1 0 5 1 2 0 1 
2 2 0 1 0 1 0 2 
2 3 0 3 1 3 2 3 
2 4 3 6 2 2 2 2 
3 1 0 2 0 5 0 1 
3 2 0 6 6 4 3 3 
3 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 




TABLE XXVIII (CONTINUED) 
First Second 
Free Ten Ten 
Condition Group Subject Conversation Minutes Minutes 
Other 1 1 0 0 0 
Empathy 1 2 0 0 0 
1 3 0 1 1 
1 4 0 2 2 
2 1 0 1 0 
2 2 0 0 0 
2 3 0 3 0 
2 4 0 2 0 
3 1 0 0 1 
3 2 0 0 1 
3 3 0 2 3 





































Self-disclosure Empathy to 
Condition Group Subject Score Score Attractiveness Cohere Meaning Enjoyment 
Nonaffective 1 1 24 39 2 4 4 4 
Self- 1 2 22 35 3 4 3 5 
disclosure 1 3 34 30 4 4 3 4 
1 4 39 40 5 4 4 4 
2 1 31 25 4 3 2 4 
2 2 22 39 4 3 3 4 
2 3 59 35 3 4 4 4 
2 4 38 34 3 4 4 4 
3 1 26 32 3 4 4 4 
3 2 23 34 4 4 4 4 
3 3 35 37 4 5 4 5 
3 4 28 40 4 4 4 4 
Impersonal 1 1 32 33 4 4 4 4 
Disclosure 1 2 38 34 4 4 4 4 
1 3 30 37 3 3 3 4 
1 4 28 29 4 4 3 4 
2 1 30 29 3 3 2 2 
2 2 38 41 3 4 5 5 
2 3 22 42 3 2 3 3 
2 4 29 35 3 3 4 4 
3 1 27 34 4 4 4 4 
3 2 28 38 4 4 4 4 
3 3 24 32 3 3 4 4 1-' 
3 4 19 34 4 4 4 4 .p. w 
TABLE XXIX (CONTINUED) 
Tendency 
Self-disclosure Empathy to 
Condition Group Subject Score Score Attractiveness Cohere Meaning Enjoyment 
Other 1 1 29 35 4 4 4 5 
Disclosure 1 2 42 36 5 5 3 5 
(Feedback) 1 3 12 33 4 5 4 5 
1 4 22 31 5 4 5 4 
2 1 41 43 4 3 3 4 
2 2 43 31 4 4 3 3 
2 3 14 46 3 3 2 4 
2 4 37 32 3 4 2 3 
3 1 39 31 4 5 5 5 
3 2 32 29 2 2 4 4 
3 3 26 37 4 3 4 4 
3 4 60 36 4 5 4 5 
Self- 1 1 38~ 38 3 3 3 3 
disclosure 1 2 34 31 4 4 4 5 
1 3 26 42 4 3 4 4 
1 4 41 29 2 3 4 4 
2 1 25 30 4 4 3 5 
2 2 40 34 4 4 4 5 
2 3 43 37 3 3 4 4 
2 4 29 40 4 2 2 2 
3 1 33 37 4 3 4 2 
3 2 37 36 3 3 4 4 
3 3 49 29 4 3 3 3 




TABLE XXIX (CONTINUED) 
Tendency 
Self-disclosure Empathy to 
Condition Group Subject Score Score Attractiveness Cohere Meaning Enjoyment 
Impersonal 1 1 21 34 4 4 4 4 
Empathy 1 2 46 44 3 3 2 4 
1 3 46 37 5 4 5 5 
1 4 39 38 3 2 3 4 
2 1 42 41 4 4 4 4 
2 2 40 36 4 4 4 4 
2 3 23 39 4 4 3 5 
2 4 29 37 5 5 3 5 
3 1 28 38 4 4 3 4 
3 2 39 31 4 4 5 4 
3 3 40 37 4 4 3 4 
3 4 39 31 4 4 4 5 
Other 1 1 41 42 5 5 5 5 
Empathy 1 2 21 38 4 4 4 4 
1 3 41 25 4 2 4 4 
1 4 32 29 4 3 4 4 
2 1 30 32 4 4 4 4 
2 2 50 40 5 5 4 5 
2 3 32 32 3 4 4 3 
2 4 30 32 3 3 4 5 
3 1 25 36 3 4 4 4 
3 2 56 31 4 4 4 4 
3 3 58 32 4 5 4 4 





CATEGORY USE DATA 
Nonaffective Other 
Self- Impersonal Disclosure Self- Impersonal Other 
Condition Group Subject disclosure Disclosure (Feedback) disclosure Empathy Empathy 
Nonaffective 1 1 67 18 1 1 1 0 
Self- 1 2 69 23 0 3 4 3 
disclosure 1 3 72 18 0 2 2 1 
1 4 71 14 0 2 1 2 
2 1 58 14 0 0 0 0 
2 2 68 26 1 0 2 0 
2 3 65 19 0 0 0 0 
2 4 65 32 0 0 3 2 
3 1 83 9 0 3 3 0 
3 2 91 46 7 3 7 0 
3 3 87 11 0 1 0 0 
3 4 89 25 0 2 2 0 
Impersonal 1 1 27 47 5 2 3 0 
Disclosure 1 2 54 57 5 5 2 3 
1 3 34 28 1 3 0 0 
1 4 61 60 2 3 6 0 
2 1 39 75 0 1 3 0 
2 2 24 73 0 1 1 0 
2 3 53 81 5 8 7 0 
2 4 49 81 2 1 11 0 
3 1 50 58 1 2 0 0 
3 2 74 48 1 8 1 0 
3 3 41 47 2 1 3 0 1-' 
3 4 44 47 1 0 2 0 
.p. 
(J'\ 
TABLE XXX (CONTINUED) 
Nonaffective Other 
Self- Impersonal Disclosure Self- Impersonal Other 
Condition Group Subject disclosure Disclosure (Feedback) disclosure Empathy Empathy 
Other 1 1 64 40 29 1 3 1 
Disclosure 1 2 34 20 23 1 2 0 
(Feedback) 1 3 35 28 21 3 0 0 
1 4 25 15 21 0 3 0 
2 1 54 44 30 4 4 1 
2 2 33 46 30 1 5 4 
2 3 42 21 11 0 3 0 
2 4 22 38 14 5 4 0 
3 1 28 22 19 1 7 0 
3 2 56 32 13 8 8 0 
3 3 9 11 8 0 0 0 
3 4 99 82 13 19 2 1 
Self-disclosure 1 1 25 6 0 5 2 0 
1 2 33 31 0 11 1 0 
1 3 54 43 0 5 1 0 
1 4 23 19 0 6 1 0 
2 1 38 35 5 9 2 0 
2 2 57 71 2 20 3 0 
2 3 24 41 4 8 3 0 
2 4 42 24 7 7 3 0 
3 1 40 28 3 11 3 0 
3 2 26 33 0 13 1 0 
3 3 31 20 1 12 0 0 




TABLE XXX (CONTINUED) 
Nonaffective Other 
Self- Impersonal Disclosure Self- Impersonal Other 
Condition Group Subject disclosure Disclosure (Feedback) disclosure Empathy Empathy 
Impersonal 1 1 17 12 0 0 8 1 
Empathy 1 2 88 55 0 1 3 2 
1 3 38 19 0 4 7 2 
1 4 81 40 0 3 10 2 
2 1 48 35 0 4 9 0 
2 2 22 19 1 1 4 0 
2 3 71 53 1 0 12 0 
2 4 53 39 1 2 14 1 
3 1 26 29 6 0 8 1 
3 2 25 18 5 0 22 1 
3 3 30 35 3 0 0 0 
3 4 79 24 7 1 14 0 
Other 1 1 50 53 1 0 0 2 
Empathy 1 2 46 46 5 2 4 1 
1 3 26 22 3 1 0 5 
1 4 99 54 6 0 3 13 
2 1 41 23 2 6 3 4 
2 2 37 21 5 4 5 2 
2 3 67 28 5 14 1 6 
2 4 31 17 6 12 8 2 
3 1 28 21 1 11 0 2 
3 2 18 17 2 1 1 1 
3 3 53 52 5 16 5 8 





PERSON PERCEPTION DATA* 
Condition Group Subject osv ov sov SA SE CG A E IO N CF PO FO PS 
Impersonal 1 1 1.23 .13 .63 .80 .99 .66 .82 .82 .63 1.65 1.10 .87 .25 1.19 
Empathy 1 2 .40 .10 .33 .78 . 75 .84 .76 .56 .30 1.18 .43 .84 .37 1.09 
1 3 .23 .00 . 30 .52 1.54 -.61 .37 1.17 . 94 2. 02 1. 23 .34 -.16 -.29 
1 4 1.10 .20 .83 1.44 1.28 .40 1.03 .93 1.13 1.34 1.06 1.43 .23 .89 
2 1 .36 .03 .16 .50 1. 08 .28 .44 .46 .18 .27 .43 1.10 .14 .83 
2 2 .43 .26 .36 . 89 ,85 -.22 .43 .57 .18 .17 .66 -.22 -.27 .20 
2 3 1. 30 .00 .93 .67 .69 .54 .47 .25 .57 .44 .90 .34 .30 .28 
2 4 1.00 ,b.O .46 .51 .83 .38 .18 .14 .58 .29 .76 .21 .22 .15 
3 1 .70 .00 .63 . 84 1. 6 7 1. 24 .71 1.26 1.28 2.05 1.03 .91 . 76 1.14 
3 2 .63 .20 • 40 1. 2 7 1. 43 .31 .95 1.40 .83 .77 1.08 1.13 1.23 .95 
3 3 .36 .13 .46 1.05 1.24 1.40 .73 1.14 1.15 1.49 .99 . 80 1.08 .69 
3 4 1.20 .13 .33 2.10 1.53 .68 1.68 1.10 .81 . 89 . 79 1. 70 . 90 1.16 
Self- 1 1 .53 .13 .80 .25 .50 .43 .33 .01 .31 .38 .41 .04 .26 .24 
disclosure 1 2 .56 .20 .40 .48 .58 .85 .41 .35 .27 1.14 .65 . 37 .45 1.47 
1 3 .23 .06 .10 .43 . 54 1.,06 .38 .40 .47 1.14 .52 .23 . 30 1.14 
1 4 .10 .03 .23 .67 • 22 1. 93 .53 .12 .61 .21 .44 . 25 .55 .28 
2 1 1. 30 .30 .73 . 36 1.10 .54 .41 .91 . 68 1. 29 .77 .42 .14 .58 
2 2 .66 .16 .53 .70 .88 .91 .61 .62 .30 .95 .74 .74 .18 .96 
2 3 .96 .03 . 86 1. 08 .56 .86 .87 .31 .38 1.24 .87 1.63 .80 .52 
2 4 . 96 .40 .43 .41 1. 38 .03 . 25 1.18 .77 .93 .65 .24 .12 .54 
3 1 1.10 .16 .83 .49 .87 -.16 .43 .81 .62 .80 .47 .49 .32 .26 
3 2 .50 .00 .63 1.38 1.34 1.06 1.08 .74 .95 1.12 .58 1.55 . 74 1. 04 
3 3 .90 .10 . 53 1. 05 1. 34 .96 .60 1.27 1.00 1.65 .99 .12 .771.37 




TABLE XXXI (CONTINUED) 
Condition Group Subject osv ov sov SA SE CG A 
Other 1 1 1.13 ,16 • 80 1. 02 1. 44 • 50 .74 
Disclosure 1 2 1.53 ,43 1.26 .91 .70 .36 o62 
(Feedback) 1 3 .66 .06 .56 .73 1.13 .38 .67 
1 4 o43 .13 .23 1o56 1,07 1.23 1.02 
2 1 .36 .13 .30 -.19 1.22 .07 -.14 
2 2 .56 .03 .43 .49 .52 .68 .34 
2 3 2,70 . 30 1. 66 -. 07 .71 .18 .08 
2 4 .76 .30 • 33 -. 72 .69 ,85 -.43 
3 1 .13 .20 • 20 1. 69 .93 1.58 1.21 
3 2 . 83 .16 .23 1.71 1.21 1.05 1.33 
3 3 '36 .13 ,26 .92 .771.27 0 85 
3 4 .43 ,16 .16 1.32 1.28 1.12 ,65 
Impersonal 1 1 1.13 .13 1.13 • 38 1.18 ,64 .33 
Disclosure 1 2 2.16 .oo . 83 .47 . 76 1.34 .38 
1 3 .43 .06 .03 .21 .61 . 68 .26 
1 4 .43 .10 .36 .78 .95 1.17 .65 
2 1 1.16 .23 . 80 1.13 1.10 .23 .39 
2 2 1.20 .56 .56 .59 1.00 .63 .80 
2 3 .so .03 .10 .95 .85 .87 .62 
2 4 1.66 .53 1.10 -.01 .42 -o25 .24 
3 1 .23 .16 .30 .so 1.00 1.17 .48 
3 2 .06 .00 .00 .21 .43 .34 .13 
3 3 .23 .10 .13 -.02 .29 ,59 -.05 
3 4 .23 .16 .03 • 88 1. 25 1. 55 .58 
E IO N CF PO FO PS 
.88 . 72 1.03 .79 .55 .47 .63 
.60 .77 .50 . 56 1. 21 .67 .37 
.90 o79 1.53 .75 .67 .22 .52 
.94 0 77 1.63 .61 .89 . 30 1. 51 
.49 -.01 .02 oll .12 .12 .28 
.31 -.20 1.16 .13 . 85 .10 1.06 
.52 .19 .64 .19 .33 .28 .34 
.30 -.13 .60 .12 .31 .26 .81 
.78 1.25 1.98 1.01 1.20 .93 1.84 
.87 .93 1.39 .89 .52 .53 . 82 
.64 .73 1.56 .59 .67 .58 1.28 
.96 lo14 1.69 1.12 • 85 .78 1.44 
.69 .53 1.56 .59 .66 .49 .58 
.58 ,28 1.21 .49 .55 .27 1.36 
.45 . 26 1.49 .44 .35 .44 .28 
.63 .54 1.76 . 41 .78 .53 1.55 
.68 . 83 1. 01 .39 .52 .41 .82 
.56 .43 . 87 .43 .48 .69 .86 
.65 .50 . 89 .31 1.00 .28 2.11 
.30 .28 1.01 .10 .19 .00 .72 
.56 .04 .91 .25 .61 . 39 1. 34 
.13 .65 o25 .55 .93 . 46 .30 
.19 .15 1.51 .35 -.44 -.52 .42 




TABLE XXXI (CONTINUED) 
Condition Group Subject osv ov sov SA SE CG A E IO N CF PO FO PS 
Nonaffective 1 1 .40 .13 .26 .54 .40 1.37 .31 .22 .37 1.80 .34 .21 . 29 . 98 
Self- 1 2 • 86 .16 .33 .27 ,14 .05 ,07 -.05 -.13 .95 • 29 .41 • 25 .40 
disclosure 1 3 .30 • 06 ,03 . 35 1.13 1. 43 .20 .57 .41 1.56 . 36 .32 .54 2.41 
1 4 .30 .20 ,33 .27 .13 -.07 .12 .15 .OS .27 .so -.05 -.02 .34 
2 1 .83 ,63 .so .43 . 82 .44 .30 .60 .37 1.32 .49 .31 .16 .43 
2 2 1.00 .10 1.23 .18 .21 .38 .25 .21 .71 . 85 • 26 .06 • 25 .26 
2 3 ,13 .03 .20 .99 1. 72 1.47 .74 .47 .46 1.40 . 31 .51 .45 1. 32 
2 4 .43 .03 .36 .90 .41 . 82 .61 .36 . 35 1. 20 .28 .77 • 83 1. 08 
3 1 1.96 . 66 1. 70 • 82 .45 -.OS .69 .40 .24 .31 .15 .79 .37 .63 
3 2 1.46 .23 .93 .37 1.54 .37 .26 .67 .53 .95 .25 .52 .80 .77 
3 3 .53 .30 .46 1.38 1.65 .51 • 79 1. 22 .60 1.15 .35 • 86 .66 .98 
3 4 1.10 .10 1.31 .35 .84 .56 .13 • .54 .52 .98 .27 .65 .38 .58 
Other 1 1 3.26 .30 2.33 1.15 1.58 .17 .51 1.20 .67 1. 03 .44 .28 -.04 -.04 
Empathy 1 2 .70 .23 .20 .18 .93 .06 .16 .54 .49 .35 .49 .48 .01 .09 
1 3 .33 . 06 .33 .60 • 57 1. 46 . 45 .48 .49 2.15 .20 • 84 • 25 1.40 
1 4 .50 .26 . 60 1.47 .17 .50 1.04 .29 .so 1.18 .37 .90 .43 .57 
2 1 .36 .13 . 26 1.15 . 78 1. 06 .92 .50 .47 .80 .64 .61 .45 .55 
2 2 .66 .16 .70 .50 .88 .63 .43 .54 . 90 1.19 .73 .48 .67 .98 
2 3 1.00 .63 .80 .83 .44 -.49 .22 .40 .66 1.26 .73 .49 .77 .14 
2 4 1.23 .13 .70 1.06 1.37 .62 .72 .91 .27 .97 .75 .78 .36 1.27 
3 1 .40 .33 . 70 1.13 • 48 1. 26 1. 02 .39 . 63 1. 24 .46 .55 .54 1. 25 
3 2 1.13 .23 .56 1.23 .97 . 75 1. 04 .70 .62 1.29 .64 .93 .41 1.12 
3 3 .40 .56 .13 • 36 1. 20 - .18 .29 • 98 1. 09 1._58 .78 .63 . 95 1.14 
3 4 .20 • 06 • 06 .79 .71 .96 .55 .66 .56 1. 33 .75 .61 .42 2.00 














Freedom Square Error Term 
1 50.02 Pooled Groups 
and Subjects 
Metaperception Versus 1 229.69 Pooled Groups 
Perception and Subjects 
Interaction 1 50.02 Pooled Groups 
and Subjects 
Grou{ls 8 164.94 Subjects 





















Freedom Square Error Term 
5 124.73 Pooled Groups 
and Subjects 
12 77.78 Subjects 
54 106.98 
TABLE XXXIV 




Freedom Square Error Term 
5 6.13 Pooled Groups 
and Subjects 













PLANNED COMPARISONS FOR EMPATHY QUESTIONNAIRE 
Comparison F1 66 Ratio 
Nonaffective Self-disclosure and Impersonal Disclosure 
versus Self-disclosure, Other Disclosure (Feedback), 
Impersonal Empathy, and Other Empathy 
Nonaffective Self-disclosure and Impersonal Disclosure 
versus Self-disclosure 
Nonaffective Self-disclosure and Impersonal Disclosure 
versus Other Disclosure (Feedback) 
Nonaffective Self-disclosure and Impersonal Disclosure 
versus Impersonal Empathy 
Nonaffective Self-disclosure and Impersonal Disclosure 














Freedom Square Error Term 
1 8.33 Pooled Groups 
and Subjects 
Versus 1 4.08 Pooled Groups 
and Subjects 
1 12.00 Pooled Groups 
and Subjects 


























ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE FOR THE 
GROUP ATTRACTIVENESS ITEM 
Degrees 
of Mean 
Freedom Square Error Term 
5 .41 Pooled Groups 
and Subjects 
12 .56 Subjects 
54 .47 
TABLE XXXVIII 




Freedom Square Error Term 
1 .08 Pooled Groups 
and Subjects 
Versus 1 .75 Pooled Groups 
and Subjects 
1 .75 Pooled Groups 
and Subjects 


















ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE FOR THE TENDENCY 
TO COHERE ITEM 
Degrees 
of Mean 
Freedom Square Error Term 
5 .99 Pooled Groups 
and Subjects 
12 0 86 Subjects 
54 .52 
TABLE XL 
PLANNED COMPARISONS FOR TENDENCY TO 
COHERE ITEM 
Comparison 
Nonaffective Self-disclosure and Impersonal Disclosure 
versus Self-disclosure, Other Disclosure (Feedback), 
Impersonal Empathy, and Other Empathy 
Nonaffective Self-disclosure and Impersonal Disclosure 
versus Self-disclosure 
Nonaffective Self-disclosure and Impersonal Disclosure 
versus Other Disclosure (Feedback) 
Nonaffective Self-disclosure and Impersonal Disclosure 
versus Impersonal Empathy 
Nonaffective Self-disclosure and Impersonal Disclosure 

























TWO FACTOR ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE FOR 
TENDENCY TO COHERE ITEM 
Degrees 
of Mean 
Freedom Square Error Term 
1 .75 Pooled Groups 
and Subjects 
Versus 1 .33 Pooled Groups 
and Subjects 
1 .33 Pooled Groups 
and Subjects 
8 . 87 Subjects 
36 .65 
TABLE XLII 




Freedom Square Error Term 
5 .53 Pooled Groups 
and Subjects 






























Freedom Square Error Term 
1 .52 Pooled Groups 
and Subjects 
Versus 1 .52 Pooled Groups 
and Subjects 
1 1.02 Pooled Groups 
and Subjects 
8 1.02 Subjects 
36 .53 
TABLE XLIV 
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE FOR THE ENJOYMENT ITEM 
Degrees 
of Mean 
Freedom Square Error Term 
5 . 81 Pooled Groups 
and Subjects 















PLANNED COMPARISONS FOR ENJOYMENT ITEM 
Comparison F1 66 Ratio 
Nonaffective Self-disclosure and Impersonal Disclosure 
versus Self-disclosure, Other Disclosure (Feedback), 
Impersonal Empathy, and Other Empathy 
Nonaffective Self-disclosure and Impersonal Disclosure 
versus Self-disclosure 
Nonaffective Self-disclosure and Impersonal Disclosure 
versus Other Disclosure (Feedback) 
Nonaffective Self-disclosure and Impersonal Disclosure 
versus Impersonal Empathy 
Nonaffective Self-disclosure and Impersonal Disclosure 










TWO FACTOR ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE FOR 
THE ENJOYMENT ITEM 
Degrees 
of Mean 
Freedom Square Error Term 
1 .19 Pooled Groups 
and Subjects 
Versus 1 .52 Pooled Groups 
and Subjects 
1 1.02 Pooled Groups 
and Subjects 


























NONSIGNIFICANT ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE FOR 
PERSON PERCEPTION VARIABLES 
Degrees 
of Mean 
Source Freedom Square Error Term 
Treatments 5 .06 Pooled Groups 
and Subjects 
Groups 12 .29 Subjects 
Subjects 54 .17 
Treatments 5 .04 Pooled Groups 
and Subjects 
Groups 12 .52 Subjects 
Subjects 54 .33 
Treatments 5 .026 Pooled Groups 
and Subjects 
Groups 12 .025 Subjects 
Subjects 54 .026 
Treatments 5 .22 Pooled Groups 
and Subjects 
Groups 12 .24 Subjects 
Subjects 54 .14 
Treatments 5 .16 Pooled Groups 
and Subjects 
Groups 12 .39 Subjects 
Subjects 54 .27 
Treatments 5 .14 Pooled Groups 
and Subjects 
Groups 12 .34 Subjects 





















Self As Other 
Variance 
TABLE XLVIII 
NONSIGNIFICANT TWO FACTOR ANALYSES OF VARIANCE 
FOR PERSON PERCEPTION VARIABLES 
Degrees 
of Mean 
Source Freedom Square Error Term 
Other Versus 1 .14 Pooled Groups 
Third Party and Subjects 
Metaperception 1 .04 Pooled Groups 
Vs. Perception and Subjects 
Interaction 1 • 005 Pooled Groups 
and Subjects 
Groups 8 .23 Subjects 
Subjects 36 .20 
Other Versus 1 .06 Pooled Groups 
Third Party and Subjects 
Metaperception 1 .0007 Pooled Groups 
Vs. Perception and Subjects 
Interaction 1 . 01 Pooled Groups 
and Subjects 
Groups 8 .50 Subjects 
Subjects 36 .43 
Other Versus 1 .06 Pooled Groups 
Third Party and Subjects 
Metaperception 1 .004 Pooled Groups 
Vs. Perception and Subjects 
Interaction 1 .04 Pooled Groups 
and Subjects 
Groups 8 .02 Subjects 

















TABLE XLVIII (CONTINUED) 
Degrees 
of Mean F 
Variable Source Freedom Square Error Term Ratio 
Congruence Other Versus 1 .03 Pooled Groups .11 
Third Party and Subjects 
Metaperception 1 .64 Pooled Groups 2.22 
Vs. Perception and Subjects 
Interaction 1 .007 Pooled Groups .03 
and Subjects 
Groups 8 .44 Subjects 1.71 
Subjects 36 .25 
Personal Other Versus 1 .0007 Pooled Groups .005 
Openness Third Party and Subjects 
Metaperception 1 .16 Pooled Groups 1.06 
Vs. Perception and Subjects 
Interaction 1 .32 Pooled Groups 2.17 
and Subjects 
Groups 8 .23 Subjects 1. 74 
Subjects 36 .13 
Perceived Other Versus 1 • 02 Pooled Groups .07 
Similarity Third Party and Subjects 
Metaperception 1 .37 Pooled Groups 1.15 
Vs. Perception and Subjects 
Interaction 1 .24 Pooled Groups .76 
and Subjects 
Groups 8 .46 Subjects 1.64 
Subjects 36 .28 
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